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IN THE UNITED S'rATES DISTRICT COu'RT FOR THE El"\.S'IERN 
DISTRICI' OF TENNESSEE, NORTHERN Dlv'ISION 
N-1MJNETA SEQUOYAH, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs 1 
vs. No. 3-79-418 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUI'HOPITY I 
. 
Defendant. 
PLAIN'riFFS' RESPONSE 'IO DEFENDJlNr' S 
MarlON rro DISHISS, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR SUI\IIMARY 
JUI)(';MENT 
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INTRODUCl'ION 
On Octcber 12, 1979 PlainUffs fHed suit 1n the Eastern Djstrict 
of Tennessee seeking injunctive relief against cOilltJletion of the Tellico Dam 
Project by the T.V.A. Plaintiffs specifically sought immediate injunctive 
relief to halt T.V.A. from flooding, further constructior1 or archeological 
excavation on sites sacred to traditional Cherokee Indians. 
On October 17, 1979 the District Court heard counsel for the 
!, 
i, 
:: 
lJ 
,, 
;I ( i 
'I 
l' 
·I 
! ! 
. t 
'! parties. The court did not rule on plaintiffs' M::>ti.on for Temporary Pestrain- i 
ing Order and denied Plaintiffs f'."otion to Derose r-'IX'. S. David Freeman, Chair-;, 
! 
:rran of the Board of Directors of •r. V .A. Counsel for T. V .A. declined to agree '; 
; to halting any construction or excavation within the project. Cour1sel for !\ 
T.V.A. further info:med the Court that T.V.A. would file responsive pleadings:: 
i I and a suprx>rting legal rrerrorandum with the Court on October 24, 1979. lJIX>n ~ i 
direction of the Court, counsel nrutually agree to present oral argument to 
. I 
' ' 
'' i! the Court on October 26, 1979 on Plaintiffs' Motion for PrelUQinary Injunctio~, 
I ~ i 
'' 
and on defa~dant T.V.A. 's responsive pleading. 
:! 
. ' On October 24, 1979. defendant T.V.A. filed MJtion to Dismiss with:: 
al te.ina ti ve !Vbtion for Surrmrry Judgrrent togeL"'ler with supfX>rting legal 
rrenorandum and three affidavits. 
·--··-·· ·----··-·· .. --------
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[ STATEMENI' OF CASE 
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In the canplaint, Plaintiff£" asserted that corrpletion of the Telliooi 
Dam Project would interfere with fundarrental rights of religious freedom 
guaranteed by the First Arrendrrent to the United States Constitution. The 
Plaintiffs further alleged that completion and floo0ing of the Tellico Dam 
would violate Plaintiffs rights to their culture, history, speech and 
association guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution; 
that cornpletion of the Tellico Dam 'WOuld violate substaJn.ti ve · rigl;its :>f Due 
~ 
i 
! 
I 
I 
Process guaranteed to the Pla:intiffs by the Fifth Amendn1ent and that corrpletion! 
i 
of the Dam would oonsti tute invidious discrimi._nation on the basis of race or I 
culture; that· carrpletion of the Darn would deny Plaintiffs the e:rual protection ! 
i 
' 
of the law guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Arrend:rrent; that I 
.J. excavation and distur:b:ing rema.ins of Cherokee graves violates rights 
... .,d·~, • . 
~ ~~'guaranteed to Pla:intiffs by the First, Fifth and Nint..l! Arrendrrents to the 
:1 
'i Constitution. The Plaintiffs further alleged that Pub. L. 96-69 did not 
repeal the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §1996, the 
National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §470, or laws of the State of 
Tennessee, T.C.A . 46-401 et ~· 
T.V.A. filed Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which this Court can grant relief, Rule 12 (b) (c) of the Federal Rules of 
~. ~ fJ~ 
· -~ Civil Procedure, and in the alternative for a sumrna.ry judgrrent under Rule 56 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds there are no issues 
of material fact before the Court and that T.V.A. is entitled to judgrrent 
as a matter of law. 
In this rrerrorandum, T. V .A. failed to address the following issues 
or claims raised by Pla:intiffs' Corrplaint and Mem:Jrandum. 
(1) Pla:intiffs right to freedom of ~ression guaranteed by the 
First Arnendrrent extends to the Pla:intiffs 1 culture, heritage and way of life. 
See "Second Claim11 , paragraphs 18 and 19 of Cal:pla:int. see also Section B 
of Plaintiffs' Marorandum at pages 20-23. 
i 
I. 
I 
l 
.I 
I 
(2) Plaintiffs 1 right to the e:;rual protection of the law guaranteed I 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 1\rrendment is denied by the invidious l 
I 
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;· 
·' 
discrimination against Plaintiffs 1 by T. V .A. on the basis of their race and I 
religion. See "Third Claim" and "Fourth Claim" 1 paragraphs 20-23 of Catplaint.l 
See also Section D of Plaintiffs 1 Merrorandurn at pages 30-32. 
By failing to respond to these claims. in their M2morandl..:up, 'IVA has 
failed sustain the burden placed on them to obtain a dismissal or SumnaJ::y 
judg:rrent under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the face of serious 
allegations of Constitutional deprivation. 'Tile failure of T.V.A. to refute 
.J 
these allegations is tantamount to an admission that said claims are genuine 
and .truew at least for purposes of the fution to Dismiss. 
Defendant T.V.A. also rroved, in the alternative, for the Court to 
treat its :Motion to Dismiss as a !-btion for Sum:nary Judg:rrent. Plaintiffs 
filed 1-btion cpposing consolidation of this alternative Motion at the Octcber 
I 
I 
J 
L· 
... { ~ .. 
I 
I 
! 
I 
! 
!
I 
I 
26, 1979 hearing on grounds that they have not yet had the "reasonable I 
~pportuni ty to present all naterial nade pertinent" to such M::>tion as provided l 
in Rule 12 (b). Plaintiffs also argue, in the alternative, that T. V.A. is not 
entitled to a Sumrra...ry Judgment because there are unresolved :rraterial issues 
of fact and because T. V .A. has failed to sustain. the burden . of establishing 
that there is no naterial issue of fact or that they are entitled to judg:rrent 
as a natter of law. 
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I.SI'.ANDAP-.DS FDR REVIEW OF PLA.INI'IFFS I f·m'ION FOR PRELll~ INJUf:JCi'ION. 
Plaintiffs seek immediate injunCtive relief to stop flooding, 
cx:mstruction or excavation of Cherokee religious sites. The purpose of this 
relief sought by the Cherokees is to preserve the status quo pending final 
cl.etennination of t'I-J.e action after a full hearing. 
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to 
prese:rve the object of the controversy in its 
then existing condition -- to preserve the status 
quo. Doeskin Products vs. United Paper Co., 
195 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1952). 
However, preservation of the status quo is not the only reason for 
granting a prel.irninary injunction. 
The mainte.."1a.Tlce of the status quo is only one of the 
reasons for which a preliminary injunction nay be granted. 
It may also be granted to prevent irreparable injury. 
Ross-vfui tney Co;rp. v. Sxni th Kline & French Lab. , 
207 F. 2d 190. 199 (9th Cir. 1953) .. I 1 i 
In a recent decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuitl 
clarified its standard for determining when a prelimiPnry injunction should 
issue. Citing 1--fetropolitan Detroit Plurrbincr anc. Jl1echanical Contractors 
~ 
Association v. :8Et'l, 418 F. Supp. 585, 586 (E.D. ~tich. 1976) the Court held: 
"In addition to assessing the likelihood of success 
on the rreri ts, the court must consider the irreparabili ty 
of any hann to the plaintiff, the balance of injury of 
the ruling on the public interest. In general, the 
likelihood. of success t~at need be shown will vary in-
versely with the degree of injury the plaintiff will 
suffer absent ail injunction . . • . 
It thus appears that the precise worc1ing of the standard 
for the likelihood. of success on the rreri ts is not as 
±mportant as a realistic appraisal of all the traditional 
factor weighed by a court of equity. A balancing is re-
quired, and not the nechanical application of a certain 
form of words. 
' I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
Roth vs. Bank of the Comrronwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978). l Previously , j 
the Court had defined the term 11 likelihood of success on the neri ts" to I 
I 
require that the District Court be satisfied "not that the plaintiff certainly I 
' ! 
has a right, but that he has a fair question to raise as to the existence I 
of such a right." American Federation of }\lsicians vs. Stein, F.2c 679, I I 
683 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954). That definition was I 
rrore recently reiterated in Brandeis !--"B.chine£( & Supply Corp. vs. 
Co., 503 F.2d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 1974). 
"(I)t will ordinarily be thought that the plaintiff 
has raised questions qoing to the rrerits so serious 
substantial, oifficult and doubtful, as to m.tke 
them a fair·grounG for litiqation and thus for mere 
delilierate investigation." Hamilton t~1atc.'l-). Co. vs. 
Benrus "?dtch Co. 206 v. 2c1 738, 740 (2nci Cir: 1953) . 
Ba:r:ber-Greene l 
'! I 
.;. 
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs are able to show they are 
subjected to irreparable hann. In claims _of interference with protected 
freedan or other constitutional rights, a fin.C.ing of irreparable injury 
arises from the nature of the right being denied. The Suprerre Court 
has specifically held: 
The loss of First Amendment freedows, for even 
m.:in.imal periods of tirre, u:r-questionably constitutes 
irreparable injury. Elrod v. BUrn.s, 427 U.S. 347, 
374 (1976). 
Other courts have also held that the inpairrrent of rights to free speech 
I 
l 
l 
I 
! 
l 
! and association is in and of itself irreparable ham, Hep:y v. First National ) 
Bank of Clarksc..ale, 424 P. Supp. 633 (NDMiss 1976), and that any signi~icant ! I 
l 
I 
denigration of First Jl.rrend.rrent rights constitutes irreparable ham. vlesting-
house Broadcasting Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895 (DCMass 1976). 
· f -~ 1- There is no question bu~ that unless TVA is directed to stop I 
! 
f i I flooding and excavations of Cherokee sits, these locations will be damaged 
or destroyed forever. Plaintiffs submit that their original Memorandum 
spelled out in detail the factual basis for their irreparable har.m, their 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the rrerits, and that TVA v.:ould not be 
prejudicial by an injunction preserving the status quo. For these reasons 
Plaintiffs review their prayer for injunctive relief. 
-5- I 
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II 
I Sl'ANDARDS FDR RE.'VII!W OF T. V •. A. 'S MJI'ICN TO DISMISS AND .MJTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUJX'MENT. 
T. V .A has noved the Court to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 
12, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon whic..~ 
' 1 1~, , ' relief can be granted. In the alternative 1 T. V .A. nove for Surrnary Judgrrent 
l 
pursuant to Rule 56, on the grounds that there is no genuine dispute as to any i 
i 
rraterial fact, and that they are entitled to judg:rrent as a rratter of law. 
T.V.A. makes no atte:rpt to define for the Court the relevant law for these 
notions. 
The Brief of T. V .A. carpletely ignores relevant assertions of 
standard of proof, burdens of proof or presmptions. As we w.ill sho.v 1 the 
law is abundant on these issues, and clearly places a heavy burden on t.~e 
noving party in either situation. T. v .A. 's reluctance to define and neet 
head on these· heavy burdens indicates they cannot do so. 
Rule 12 (b) (6) provides that an action may be dismissed if the 
I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
l 
I 
! 
I 
I 
!· 
1 
pleadings are clearly -v.lithoot rre.rit. In determining the propriety of a ruling! 
on such a notion, the allegations of the corrplaint and supporting affidavits I 
must be accepted as true. C'-.ardner v. Toilet Qx:ds Assoc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967) ~ 
L'Orange v. Yedical Protective Canpany, 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) .· l MJreoverJ, 
a ca:rplaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a 
certainty that plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of 
facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Haines v. Ken1er, · 404 
U.S. 519 (1972), Lemron v. Cedar Point, IncorJ?Orated, 406 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 
1969). Plaintiffs have alleged substantial constitutional and statuto:ry 
violations on the part pf defendants in the ca:rplaint, attached e.xhilii ts, 
affidavits a"ld nenorandum of law. These substantial claims shall not be 
dismissed prior to a full evidentiary hearing. 
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The pluintiffs contend 'IVA has not net the rt:..'qtdrenents for obtaining such r<..>J i 1d 
j 
SLl!lliTB.ry Judgrrent nay be granted only \\here the Court determines that there I 
is no genuine issue as to any rmteriul fact and that c1 trial on the m3rits I ~ 
1 would be useless. The party rroving for Sunm..1.ry ,Judqnent has the burden of 
shc.Ming the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, Fitzke v. 
Shappel, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077, (6th Cir. 1972), and where the trial court is 
I presented with a choice of inferences to be drawn form the subsidiary facts 
I contained in the afficlavits or attached exhibits: 
"On surrm.1.ry j udqrrent the in ferenccs to }X) 
draWn from the underlying facts contained 
in such rraterials must be. viewE..>d in the light 
I rrost favorable to the party opposinq the rrotion. " I United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). 
·Plaintiffs have alleged substantial constitutional violations by 
·I 
'T.V.A. Numerous affidavits of li1dividual 01crok0e Indians and 01erokee 
Iredicine rren point out the religious significance of the area to be inundate:.'C1. 
I Affidavits submitted by anthrcpologists attest to the inportance which this 
I 
11 area has to be contmuance of the religious and cultural way of life of the 
01erokee Tribe and to the individual 01erokee. The pleadings, attacr.rrents 
they are entitled to judgrrent as a matte:: of law; See, t-1ack v. Cape Elizabeth 
School Board, 558 F.2d 634 (lst. Cir. 1977), when the court said the rroving 
party must rover all issues. Co:rp. v. Storm King Corp,., 303 F.2d 425, 427 (6th 
't, ·, 
. · ;.i /::, \~~.;:. :i·!(· .. : .;.. I ·:~·'' ' :: 
• 
. , . 
'·.· 
' .. 
. ,,,' -~ ' . 
. ·: 
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I 
I 
Cjr. 1962) 1 stated: 
In ruling on a notion for surrrna.ry j udgrrent 1 
the court must construe-the evidence in its 
rrost favorable liqht in favor of the party 
opposing the rrotion and against the rrovant. 
Further, the papers supporting- the rrovant 
are closely scrutinized, whereas t~e opponent's 
are indulgently treated. /1 
Plaintiffs have alleged a variety of cx:mplex issues of fact and law. The 
Courts have stated that a cautious approach should be utilized in cases 
involving such instances: 
. This Court has on several occasions expressed 
the view that a trial judge should be slew in 
disposi_Dg of a case of any COlll=Jlexity on a 
notion for st:IJ1lt1a.rY judgrrent, t..~at v.hile such a 
judgment wisely used is a praiseworthy and 
timesaving device, yet such prompt dispatch of 
jtrlicial business is neither the sole nor th·e 
primary purpose for which courts have been 
established and that a party should not be 
deprived of an opportur..ity to fully develop 
his case by witnesses anc. a trial, when the 
issues involved make such procedure an appro-
. priate one. /2 
- II 
.:: 
l 
I 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
' 
T 
I 
I 
I 
i 
! 
I 
1 
l 
S.J. Groves & Sons v. Ohio Turnpike Carrm. 1 315 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 375 u.s. 824 (1963) . 
By its very nature Sl.llmBIY j udgrrent is apt to be ill-sui teci to 
cases of a carnple..x nature or to those which involve constitutional or other 
.lltportant public issues, 'Which often need the full exploration of trial. /3 I 
This is the situation in the instant case. Furthenrore, the function of the I 
smmary judg:rrent is to avoid a useless trial. Hcwever, a trail is not useless 
but absolutely necessary where there is a genuine issue as to any rraterial 
fact. Bland v. Norfolk and Southern Railroad Crnpany, 406 F. 2d 863 1 866 
I 
t 
(4th Cir. 1969), ~tintz v. ~athers Fund, Inc. 463 F.2~ 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1972) J 
. I 
ll See also, Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Crnpany, 491 P. 2d 1193, 1195 
(6th Cir. 1974) • 
See also, Hart v. Johnston, 389 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1968). 2/ 
3/ see, 6 Pt. 2, l·rore's Federal Practice § 56.16 (2d.ed. 1972), and cases 
c1.ted. therein. 
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I 
T.V.A. has noved this Court for surmary judgn:ent based on the I 
affinnative defense of laches. The sane basic principles nnderlying sur:mna:ry j 
! ju::lgm::mt in general detennine the propriety of surrma.ry judgment on the j 
basis of laches. Unless the defense of laches is legally sufficient and I 
the noving party clearly establishes th..at there is no genuine issue of material 
fact as to laches, then his notion grounc1.ed on that defense should be denied. l 
I 
I 
1 
In Ecology Center of Louisiana v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975), the 
1 Court denied defendant's rrotion for SUI1IP.cu:y judgrrent based on laches, concludintJ 
that issues of ro.aterial fact existed, and that: 
This Court has especially noted that caution 
is called for before laches is applied on 
sumnary judgrrent where the facts have only 
been developed in affidavits and allegations. 
See, Powell v. City of Key I·Jest, 4~4 F.2d 
1975, 1980. 
515 F.2d at 867 n.8. 
"The factual issues involved in a laches 
defense can rarely be resolved. without sorre 
prelirPinary evidentiary inquiry. " ~ino v. 
Ocean Cargo Line, Ltd., 382 F.2s 67, 68 (9th 
Cir. 1967).4/ 
4/ See also, Salokawsky v. Deutsc..1-t Darrplschifahuts ('..,esellshaft 
"I-fcnda," 283 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Penn. 1968) (surrrnary judgrrent 
based on laches denied despite 37 rronth delay); Molnar v. 
Gulfcoast Transit Co., 371 F.2d 639, 640 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(surrrrary judgrrent denied and case rerranded for factual· deter-
mination regarding laches 'Where a 3 ..:. 4 1/2 year delay took 
place). 
-9-
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III. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PRESENTED A PRI~~ FACIE FIRST AMENDMENT .CLAIM 
Defendant TVA begins its analysis of plaintiffs First Amendment free 
l! exercise claim by stating that the religious freedom claim must fail because 
ij 
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Congress or a federal agency is without restraints in its use of public lands, 
even if that use results in the disinterment of gravesites. Plaintiffs infer 
from TVA's argument that it is their contention that Cherokee gravesites are 
subject to the power of eminent domain. This claim is clearly irrelevant to 
the constitutional issues before this Court. 
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EMINENT DOMAIN 
In support of its argument that Congress or a fedettal agency is il p 
j!unrestrained in its use of public lands, defendant cites a number of cases 
I. II involving the principle of eminent domain 
'• I!More or Less, of Land, 28 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. ILL. 1939); Campbell vs. City of li II Kansas, 13 S. W. 897 (Mo. 1980) , and federal pre-emption. Kleppe vs. New Mexico, 
q 426 U.S. 529 (1976). None of these cases contain allegations of infringement ,, 
United States vs. Sixty Acres 
" !:of a First Amendment right or any other fundamental constitutional right. The 
H 
!leases are therefore, inapposite. Ind2ed, plaintiffs are alarmed by the legal 
jlproposition TVA seems to be advocating. Despite TVA's contrary implication, 
,l 
lithe United States is not an ordinary property owner, and its use of property is 
i! subject to a number of singular limitations, including those in the First Amend- • .:· 
llment. The government may not, for example, permit uses of its property which 
!!would effect an interference with rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. jl 
1i !rHague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 30, U.S. 496 (1939); Harsh v. d 
H !jAlabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz ~· I· 
!!New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Ed\vards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); ,, 
!I 
licox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan! 
I 
·Valley Plaza, Inc.," 319 U.S. 308 (1967); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 
1147 (1969); Organization for a Better Austin vs. Keefe, 402, U.S. 415 (1971). 
I 
. 1\ Nor, as defendant would have this Court believe, does the fact that 
lt Congress enacted a law which mandates a constitutionally impermissable use of 
I public land immunize that law or the land use from constitutional attack. It 
i 
!,was to prevent that very occurrence that the First Amendment was enacted. 
r 
I 
II 
'I :I li 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof. 
i 
Defendant also cites U. S. v. Sixty Acres More or ·Less, of Land, supra~ 
\for il the proposition that gravesites are not immune from destruction for public i il 
iprojects. ! . Again, that case raises only issues of 
I 
eminent domain, and the record; 
i 
lis silent as to the religious significance of the gravesites at issue, if, indee4, 
they had any special religious connotation to the plaintiffs therein. 
The major defense to plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise Claim 
ests on an attack upon the genuineness and sincerity of plaintiffs' rPligious 
1
1beliefs, which is a factual issue to be determined by the Court at a full 
II I hearing on the merits. Defendants cite as an example, albeit tenuous, of 
I 
I! -]]-
' ,, 
,j 
il ii 
,I 
'I !, 
II 
il plaintiffs' lack of sincerity of their religious beliefs, the omission of any 
II 
:I 
free exercise claims by the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians to the United Stat~s 
Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill, supra. i It should be noted the Eastern Band, only l 
one of the plaintiffs, appeared in TVA vs. Hill as an amicus curiae, not as a 
' i 
II / and h · f d dd · lf h · · d b h 1 party, 1  t at capac1ty was orce to a ress ltse to t e 1ssues ra1se y t ~ 
1j parties to that litigation, to wit: enforcement of the Endangered Species Act. !I 
II Clearly, a discussion of plaintiff Eastern Band's religious freedom was II 
ll ji irrelevant to the TVA v. Hill litigation. Given this background, TVA's conclu-
I( q sion that plaintiffs are barred from "relitigating" the free exercise claim jl q 
11 now asserted is puzz.ling. 
! TVA.more directly attacks the sincerity of plaintiffs' religious 
' I beliefs in other portions o~ its brief. TVA questions and disputes statements 
.I l! of fact contained in the affidavits o.f Ammoneta Sequoyah (Plaintiffs' Exhibit p 
1l D),* Iva Rattler (Plaintiffs' Exhibit CC) and Emmaline Driver (Plaintiffs' ~~ Exhibit X). TVA then makes several allegations of fact of its own which 
' 
:I 
!1 plaintiffs vigorously dispute, such as the natu-re of the Eastern Band's previous' ll 
h "'r:* !l objections to thr:: Tellico Dam Project. Clearly these statments of fact, 
1! which plaintiffs dispute, and TVA's express disagreement with the facts 
!j presented by plaintiffs affidavits are grounds for the denial of TVA's motion I for summary judgment. Dewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1950). I The affidavit of Ross Swimmer submitted in support of TVA's motion 
~~ for summary judgment further confuses the facts asserted by plaintiffs and 
, compels a denial of TVA's motion for summary judgment. According to Swimmer, l I 
I the Cherokee sites along the Little Tennessee River are "important to the 
cultural history of the Cherokee Nation, but are not part of its religion." 
Swimmer, an acknowledged banker, lawyer, and Indian Chief.makes theses ! 
11 assertions of fact without claiming any expertise in the Cherokee religion and ,, 
_q c;ulture.. His affidavit fails to qualify him as an expert in any of the areas I 
* t Defendants also state at p. 18 of their brief that Sequoah could not have I possibly visited Chota prior to its location being revea-led by TVA Is archeo-' 
1, logical investigations. Plaintiffs find this statement amusing. The Cherokees have always known the location of Chota. TVA has simply revealed its location 
!
! to the Hhite man. Again, this is a question of fact which should be resolved 
I by the Court. I' ,, 
:I 
11 
II II 
·I \I 
** Surely 
plans to 
to visit 
TVA does not seriously contend that Plaintiffs were pleased with TVA's 
recreate Chota. This would be like a Greek citizen going to Nashville the Parthenon. 
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I 
in which he attempts to enlighten this Court. Swimmer is qualified only to 
discuss his own religious beliefs, and these have no bearing on the validity of 
the sincerity of plaintiffs religious beliefs. Nor does· the fact that Swim.'ller 
j!and other members of the Cherokee Nation deny any religious significance in 
jlthe Tellico sites minimize the beliefs or interests of plaintiffs. Teterud v. 
,,Burns, 552 F.2d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1975). (Indian plaintiff was not required I j to prove that wearing of long braided hair \vas absolute tenet of Indian religion i 
' l practiced by all Indians in order to establish his religious beliefs.) More-
llover, it is Swimmer who fails to understand the interaction between Cherokee 
~~cultural history and religion and not the plaintiffs as TVA would have this 
!iCourt believe. Indeed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §1995 
I' explicity recognized the reLigious practice of American Indians is an "integral 
I part of their culture, tradition and :heritage" and that such practices "form I the basis of Indian identity and value systems. For the aforementioned reasons, I. 
I! plaintiffs have moved to .,strike Swimmer's affidavit. 
I( 
!j PROPERTY INTERESTS I, 
l! Plaintiffs now turn to TVA's discussion of Badoni v. Higginson 455 F. ,, 
!i!supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), appeal pending, No. 78-1517 (lOth Cir.), 1.Jisconsin v. I I! jiYoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Defendant TVA relies heavily on Badoni v. Higginson~ 
\supra and that Court's interpretation of Yoder v. Hisconsin, supra, in arguin;_. ; 
I 
. ~~for dismissal of the complaint and for summary judgment. The reliance of TVA on\ 
!1 Badoni, which is currently on appeal before the U. S. Court of Appeals for the : 
·~ij 'T h C . . . . ., d f 1 Th C 1 ' d · t I en.t 1rcu1t, lS m1sp.1.ace or severa reasons. . e ourt app 1e 1ncorrec 
~standards of law, failed to give due considerations to the record (especially 
taking into account the substantial burden on a movant for summary judgment), 
I and misapprehended the nature of the Navajo plaintiffs' ~laims. Because of i 
J'the parallels between the factual situations in Badoni and this suit, plaintiffs! 
~~ feel it would be helpful to this Court· to unde~take a thorough examination of 1 
the Badoni decision. The discussion may also assist this court in avoiding 
the mistakes made by the Badoni court and urged by TVA. Following a discussion 
,' 
lof the erroneous analysis of the facts by the Court 
set out the proper test to be used in measuring and 
i interests of plaintiffs. 
II 
II 
lj 
I! 
·I (I 
~ : 
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weighing the First Amendment! 
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The district court in Badoni ruled that: 1) having no property 
I interest in Rainbow Bridge, plaintiffs were barred from litigating their 
11 asserted religious beliefs in that natural feature; 2) plaintiffs had not 
·1 established the existence of a bona fide, sincere religious interest sufficient 
I ! to warrant protection; 3) the interest of the defendants in the status quo 
I operation of the dam and reservoir overcame appellants' interest as to any 
!lpossible·relief considered by the Court. 
II The Badoni decision fails to cite any precedent for the proposition 
II that "the lack of property interest is determinative of the First Amendment 
I, 
I I. question", 455 F. Supp. at 644. 
than Badoni. The Federal Courts have been consistent in holding that standing 
Nor does. defendant TVA cite any precedent otheri 
i 
I· ;I in a Free Exercise case may be predicted solely upon non-economic interests 
jl 
jjand that title to the real estate involved is irrelevant. A leading decision on; 
II . il standing issues, Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
I' 1!150, 154 (1970) addressed the question squarely saying: 
I' 
ll i! 
·! 
u 
A person or a family may have a spiritual stake 
in First Amendment values sufficient to give 
standing to raise issued concerning the . 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 
!I 
!!Citing Association of Data Processing Service Orgs., supra, among others, the 
~~D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that: 
I! d 
I' 
., 
II 
I· l 
standing to present claims found on the 
Constitution may stem from non-economic 
values as well as economic values. The 
[Supreme] Court made it particularly clear 
that there is a readiness to find standing 
conferred by non-economic values in order 
to consider issue~ concerning the Establish- . 
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. I !Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Moreover, in the leading 
' * I cases in which statutes were challenged as violating tpe Free Exercise of 
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court found it sufficient 
I ithat litigants claimed an infringement of a spiritual belief and never even 
raised the necessity of a property interest. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 
l (1978); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra; 
l-------
11* l Plaintiffs wish to remind the Court that unlike the situation in Badoni where 
1 the Navajo Plaintiffs were challenging the usage of public lands, Plaintiffs 
herein are challenging an Act of Congress. 
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II 
'MCGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). l See Spruce v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797 
il :, 
!I 
(6th Cir. 1972); Protestants, ~tc. vs. U.S., 435 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th. Cir: 1970). 
These cases compel t.he conclusion that the Badoni' s concern, adopted 
by TVA, about possible "disruption of the property rights of others" is mis-
11 placed. Despite that court's contrary implication, the United States is not I. 
lj an ordinary property owner, and its use of its property is subject to a number 
1! 
~~ of singular lil!litations, including those in the First An1endment. Hague, supra; 
l'l Marsh, ~upra; Niemotko, sunra; Kunz, supra, Edwards, supr~; Cox, supra; Logan I :; Valley Plaza, Inc., supra; Shuttlesworth, supra; Keefe, supra. And, even if II 
if ~~ an Act of Congress mandates such usage. In Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of I. 
lj the Capitol Police, 342 F. Supp. 577 (D.D.C. 1972), a three judge court found !! ~~ unconstitutional an Act of Congress, 40 U.S.C. 1933, which prohibited public 
I! ! assembles on the Capitol grounds and enjoined the defendants from enforcing !I 
11 the statute. ,, 
~~ Badoni' s exaggerated example of the possible "troublesome results" 
11 
11 which would col!le from permitting claims such as appellants' to be heard, 455 
l. F. Supp. at 641, and which is reiterated in defendant TVA's brief, is entirely 
,, beside the point. Specious claims vould be precluded by careful inquiry into 
l I the bona fides of a person's claimed religious beleifs. Founding Church of 
I 
Scientology v. U.S., 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied. 396 U.S. 963 
(1969); U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); U.S. v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 I• 
lkn.D.C. 1968). Moreover, any claims seeking to affect the government's use of 
II its property must be considered in light of the government's interest. Importan\t 
I interests need not be impaired. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
After concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to present 
nature of the state interest. The Court further observed that for the purposes 
of the motions before it, it accepted as true the plaintiffs' allegations as to 
the nature and sincerity of their religious beliefs. 
-15-
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ANALYSIS OF BADONI V. HIGGINSON 
The legal standard applied in Badoni to determine the existence of 
bona fide, sincere religious beliefs was derived from a. phrase in Wisconsin v. 
I Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), a leading Free Exercise case •. 
!I 
There, members of 
II d 
II 
the Amish faith sought exemption for their children from the last two years of 
compulsory education mandated by the state law, claiming that their religion 
pervaded and determined their way of life, that the final two years of state-
required education exposed their children to influences conflicting with A~ish 
I beliefs and interposed a barrier to the full·intergration of their children into 
the Amish religious community, and that, therefore, compliance with the state 
I law threatened to undermine their entire way of life, and their religion with 
I, 
·j 
II ll 
I 
it. In reviewing the nature of the Amish claims, the Supreme Court remarked, 
at 216 that 
the record in this case abundantly supports 
the claim that the traditional way of life 
of the Amish is not merely a matter of 
personal preference, but one of deep religious 
conviction, shared by an organized group, and 
intimately related to daily living. 
II The Badoni court recited this passage in its opinion, emphasizing the "deep 
I religious conviction" language and adopted that phrase as the standard by 
which it measures the sincerity and bona fides of the religious beliefs of the 
I j Badoni plaintiffs. The Cherokees contend that phase was never intended as a I general legal standard for measuring the genuineness of religious beliefs, and 
that few religions would ever pass muster under it. The court's use of the 
standard fundamentally flawed its entire discussion of this issue. 
I 
I The quoted passage from Yoder was important in that case, because the 
I 
nature of the claim was that the simple lifestyle of the Amish themselves 1 
i 
was so thoroughly permeated by religious beliefs and values that its preservatiop 
.jwas essential to the continuation of the Amish faith. The Supreme Court thus 
I saw its first task to be to '.'determine whether the Amish religious faith and 
i 
their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent." 406 U. Sj. 
I. 
'I ! 
at 215·. If it were found that the lifestyle was based upon merely secular 
considerations, that lifestyle would not be entitled to the First Amendment 
protec.tion that the Amish argued for. In the passage from page 216 of the 
opinion, quoted above and by the Handoni court, the Supreme Court simply found 
that the record did indeed support the Amish argument on that issue. The 
pa~sage is descriptive of the Amish way of life, not definitional of a "sinCl~re 
-16-
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~~ religious belief." 
! If used as a test for anything, the description could only 
l test whether a way of life is religiously based. The Amish claims were I 
*I I d" . . !I 1st1nct1ve. 
II 
11 ld., pp. 209, 219. 
The nature and sincerity of their beleifs were not even challenged;. 
I Additionally, the Yoder description of the Amish is far too exclusive 
I! to serve as a test of religious beliefs. As the Supreme Court noted, at 236, 
I[ the Amish sh,owing was one that "probably few other religious groups or sects d 
! l could make. " !. 
!j 
To require that a religious claim under the First Amendment 
11 constitutes "deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group and I' I 
i 
i intimately related to daily living" would exclude many beliefs that have alread~ 
I! been recognized . as religions. 
11 have eclectic beliefs that are not uniformly shared, and very fe" can make the 
Some religions are highly unstructured. Others 
11 Amish claim that their beliefs are thor?ughly and intimately related to the 
j daily lives of their adherents. These faiths would not be protected under the 
!l standard the court utilized in Badoni. 
'I 
l1 The standard applied by the Court, therefore, is not meant to be used 
It was an issue in Yoder because of II as a standard for other religious beleifs. 
II the uniqueness of the Amish claims, and for the same reason has no applicabilitY; 
li, ' to the instant proceeding. ! 
'I II I. 
II 
I 
,I 
jl ,, 
" 
.. 
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The Badoni court compounded this fundamental error by 
its incomplete reference to the record, and its misuse of that 
portion of the record it did refer to. At 455 F. Supp. 646, 
referring to appellants' answers to interrogatories, the court 
stated: 
• • • discovery documents filed in this case indicate, among other things, that the 
medicine men who ·allegedly conduct the reli-gious rites involving Rainbow Bridge and the 
surrounding areas are not recognized by the Navajo Nation as such. Also, the training 
of these medicine men has not been tribally 
organized or carried out, and took place years 
ago. The individually-named plaintiffs have 
attended a combined total of nine religious 
ceremonies within the boundaries of Rainbow 
Bridge Monument since 1965 (question 5(c), at p. 7) and the same plaintiffs had attended 
religious ceremonies within the boundaries of Rainbow Bridge ~onument only infrequently prior 
to 1964 (question 5(d), at p. 8). None of the individually-named plaintiffs answering inter-
rogatories could identify times at which other 
ceremonies were .held or hO'It-7 many individuals 
attended (question 5(i) (l), at p. 9). The 
eight individually-named plaintiffs had 
visited the monument a combined total of 
eleven times since 1965, and such visits were infrequent • 
i 
·l 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
. I 
From these facts the court concluded that "there is 
I 
I nothing to indicate that at the present time the Rainbow Bridge I 
National Monument and its environs has anything approaching deep, I 
religious significance to any organized group, or in recent decade!s 
I has been intimately related to the daily living of any group 
or individual. " 455 F. Supp. at 646. 
Aside from the fact that the conclusion is irrelevant, I inasmuch as it applied the erroneous "standard" derived from 
Yoder, the facts recited say nothing whatever as to the sincerity 
or genuinenes~ of plainti£fsl religious beliefs. 
The fact that medicine men among the Navajo are not 
recognized as such by the Navajo Nation, and that their training 
"has not been tribally organized or carried out, and took 
place years ago," while true, should not be used to discount I the sincerity of the religious beliefs at issue. Must other 
!religions have their clergy formally approved by the state, 
and trained according to government-sanctioned, organized pro-
cedures, in order to receive constitutional recognition and 
I 
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and protection? The Badoni court appears to be imposing its own 
I standard of orthodoxy and, finding that traditional Navajo I religion fails to measure up to it, denying the religion any 
r recognition as such. The case law is uniform in proscribing such I j. an approach. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 u.s. 488 (1961), at 495; 
Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 
127 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 
(1953); U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); 
j Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N._J. 1977), at 1326. Like 
I the Navajo religion, the traditional Cherokee religion is highly II 
. j decentralized, unstandardized and extremely private in nature. 
I 
. 
Th~ court's treatment of the interrogatory responses 
on frequency of ceremonies is even more objectionable. 
11 While ~ t might be fair to assess· the sincerity of asserted 
~~ religious beliefs by evidence going to the consistency with 
which those beliefs are practiced, consistency must be deter-
! mined in proper context. Numbers alone tell nothing. For I 
example, a Jewish person who is shown to have seldom observed 
the Sabbath might not prevail on a First Amendment objection ·to 
Saturday employment. Similarly, in Yoder, the consistent way 
of life of the Amish substantiated the sincerity of their 
difficult claim that their religious practices were coextensive 
with their life pattern. If a practice calls for performance 
jonce a week, as in the first example, evidence of performance 
I 
every six months, without more, might indicate insincerity. 
In the second example, the practice required essentially 
continuous performance. Merely occasional practice of an l allegedly religiously prescribed lifestyle might likewise de-
monstrate insincerity. 
If a practice requires performance only periodically, 
and the requirement if fulfilled, there is no demonstration of 
insincerity. To discount the practice on the grounds of 
lack of consistency or infrequency, constitutes an impermissable 
The very nature of the practice becomes I judgment of invalidity. 
II 
\! 
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the basis for its devaluation; its lack of periodicity is used 
to disqualify it. If a rnillenialist sect like the Jehovah's 
witnesses believes that certain ~vents portend the possible 
second corning of Christ, and the right mixture of events occurs 
at odd intervals, months, or even years apart, are ritualistic 
practices undertaken to prepare for the big event insufficient 
religious interests to warrant protection? 
The affidavits submitted in Badoni point out that, I' Ji similar to Cherokee ceremonials, Navajo ceremonials, including 
r those associated with Rainbow Bridge, were performed only at the 
1! request of individuals , families , or other groups, and that 
where there was no apparent need for the power a particular 
ceremony conveys, its use might die out for a time. In times of 
abundant rainfall, thus, a rain-bringing ceremony might fall 
into d~suse. Other factors such as the age of the medicine man? 
weather conditions and the length of the trip to a religious 
ceremonial site could explain the infrequency of ceremonies 
at Rainbow Bridge, or to the Little Tennessee Valley, if in fact 
they are infrequent 'tvhen viewed in context. 
Of greater concern is the fact that the Badoni court 
took the evidence of ceremonial frequency as an indicator not 
: 
t 
1 
I 
l 
! just of sincerity of belief, but of the ~thentici ty of appellants!' 
religious interest itself. Consistency of performance is a 
limited enough measure of sincerity; but to use it to arrive 
at a judgment of the validity·of the religion is condemned 
uniformly by the precedents. Fowler v. Rhode Island, supra; 
U.S. v. Ballard, suera, Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871 
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp& 547 (S.D. Iowa 
1973); People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rep. 69, 394 P. 2d 813 (1964); 
; 
i 
i 
i 
I 
I 
l 
i 
Malnak v. Yogi, SUJ?ra. I In essence, the Badoni court found that I 
because the Navajo plaintiffs~ religion i.s conducted infrequently I 
I 
and irregularly by unofficial and aged practitioners who received 
their training by apprenticeship rather than by attending some 
officially sanctioned course, the religion itself does not 
qualify for constitutional protection. Such a ruling flies in 
-20-
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the face of precedent, sets up arbitrary standards which are 
demeaning to the Navajo plaintiffs' beliefs and offends funda-
mental First Amendment principles. 
-21-
l 
i 
. I 
,I 
I 
Perhaps most remarkable is that the Badoni court based its entire 
assessrrent of the authenticity of appellants' religious beliefs on its 
skewed perception of practices. It never placed any weight on the nature 
of substance of appellants' religious beliefs in the course of its analysis, 
even though, as the cases have held, it is the nature of one's beliefs, not 
the degree to which a practice adheres to some definitional nonn, which 
11 -determines whether an assertedly religious belief qualifies for protection 
I 
\r 
II 
li 
' i 
under the First Amendment. U.S. v. Seeger, supra; Founding Olurch of 
Scientology v. U. S., supra; Fellcwship of H1.1Tilli1ity v. County of Alameda, 
153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 p.2d 394 (1957). The Court denied any deep 
religious significance to plaintiffs' belief on the basis of its views that 
the practice was insubstantial. 'Ib use that analysis to condemn the system 
of belief pe~Jerts basic First Amendment doctrines. 
Again, the Badoni court applied some supposedly objective nonn 
!I of what it thinks religion is supposed to be. 
II 
Conc:edely, the Navajo plaintiffs!' 
II 
'I 
I, 
II 
., 
' 
system of belief and practice at issue in Badoni is akin to that of the Cher-
okees in that both are distinctive and unconventional. They have no fonnal 
structure or establishment. They are passed orally through lengthy apprenticeship 
They are highly decentralized and decidedly esoteric. But the uncontradicted 
evidence in both instances is that they are unquestionably religious in nature,! 
! 
and highly sophisticated. There is thus no basis for the Badoni court nor for i 
that matter, this Court, to devalue either the Navajo or Cherokee beliefs, or ~ 
accord them sorre lower degree of protection than more orthodox faiths would be 
entitled to. As Justice Jackson delcare in West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, supra, at 638, 642, 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subject from the vicissi-
tudes of political controversy, to place them 
beyond the reach of rrajorities and officials 
and to establish them as legal principles to 
be applied by the court. If there is any 
fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation, it is that no official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, ·u:ttionalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion . . • 
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Finally, it is important to note that the Badoni court 
reached its conclusions as to the significance and sincerity 
on a motion by defendants for summary-judgment. As previously 
stated, on such a motion, the authorities are in agreement that 
the movant has the burden of showing the absence of any material 
issue of fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
I matter of_ law. 6 Moore's Federal Practice 1[56 .15 [3], and cases 
I there cited. It is not the court's role to resolve fact I issues: where such issues exist, the motion should be denied. 
pewey v. Clark, 180 F.2d 766 (D.C.Cir. 1950}. The record, 
moreover, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
the religious community in o~der to amount to anything II constitutionally is an illogical and impossible standard for most 
j! religions (the Amish being a notable exception). For a middle-
1 class Presbyterian to have to show a "vital relationship" between 
r any of his religi.ous practices and the Presbyterian "way of life" 
is patently nonsensical proposition. Few religions indeed can 
l 
boast that their adherents have any distinctive way of life, much 
II less that there is any relationship, vital or otherwise, between I it and the practices of the religion. 
PROPER ANALYSIS FOR THIS COURT TO FOLLOW I 
·I 
I Having demonstrated that the analysis of the Badoni '! 
court was in error, it remains only to outline the proper analysis 
that this court should employ in denying the TVA's motion for . \ I 
I 
I 
summary judgment. 
The first task of a court faced with a claim that 
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governmental action has infringed the free exercise of the 
claimant's religion, is to ascertain that the claim is rooted 
in a system of belief whfch is in fact religious. Yoder, 
supra, at 215-216; Founding Church of-Scientology, supra at 
1160. Although a court may not inquire into the validity of 
the religious beliefs or dogma, as such (see U.S. v. Ballard, 
supra, where the court said, at 88, "Men may believe what they 
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their 
! 1. . . Ire lglous doctrlnes or beliefs."), it may determine whether a 
scheme of belief is properly called religious for constitutional 
I l purposes. Yoder, at 215-216; Founding Church of Scientology, 
I at 1160; U.S. v. Kuch, supra. The concept of religion, however., 
lis to be broadly construed. Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, at I 1495; S~eger, supra; U.S. v. Welsh, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Founding 
jChurch.ofScientology, supra; Fellowship of Humanity v. County 
I of Alameda, supra; Malnak v. Yogi, supra. A court is also 
J obliged to ascertain that the asserted religious beliefs are 
' 
i 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
i 
l 
I 
l 
i 
jheld sincerely and in good faith. Founding Church of Scientology,! 
lsupra, at 1162; u.s. v. Ballard, supra. Once a system of I practice and belief is shown to be religious, and the claimant 
to be sincere, the court must determine whether acts of the 
. government have in fact infringed the free exercise of that 
religion. Yoder, at 214; Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 404. 
liv.hat constitutes infringement must depend on the facts of the 
particular case. In Abington School District v.· Schempp, 374 
203, 223 (1963), the court stated, that: 
it is necessary in a free exercise case for 
one to show the coercive effect of the·en~ 
actment as it operated against him in the 
practice of his religion. 
lrn Yoder, the infringement arose from the fact that two years 
l 
! 
! 
l u.s.\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
of secondary education would expose Amish children to influences 
contrary to the Amish lifestyle~ Torcaso v. Watkins, supra, 
involved a requirement that persons assuming public office 
declare a belief in the existence of God," a requirement that a 
unanimous Court held infringed the religious freedom of a non-
I -24-
believer. In Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 704 (1977), a New 
Hampshire requirement that license plates bear the state motto, 
"Live Free or Die," was held to infringe the religious precepts 
unemployment compensation because her religion would not permit 
her to accept employment that required her to work on Saturdays 
was held to constitute unlawful abridgement of her religious 
beliefs. The Court there quoted Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 
599 (1961), at 607, that "if the purpose or effect of a law is 
to impede the observance of one or all religions that law is 
11 invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being 
only indirect." I 
i 
I 
I 
Infringement under the cases, thus need not be the 
state shutting the doors to the church. State action which has 
! 
i 
I 
• I 
any coercive effect on one's religious beliefs, however indirect,( 
or impedes the practice of one's religion, however lightly, may 
be held to constitute infringement. 
Once the infringement to a claimant's free exercise of 
.. 
religion has been established, the court must then examine 
the government interests at issue. The Supreme Court has held 
that two showings are essential to demonstrating the validity 
of the challenged state action. The first is a showing that 
i 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
! 
I any incidental burden on the free exercise 1 
of appellant's religion may.be justified by 1 
·a compelling state interest in the regula-
tion of a subject within the state's consti- I tutional power to regulate • • • " ' 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 I Sherbert v. Verner, at 403, quoting NAACP 
I 
!: 
( 19 6 2) , at 4 3 8 • As to this question, the Court stated, 
no showing merely of a rational relation-
ship to some colorable state interest would 
suffice; in this highly sensitive- constitu-
tional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, en-dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissable limitation." 
Sherbert, at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 u.s. 516 
(1974), at 530. Second, it must be established that "no alter-
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
v 
.·. 
,,· 
native forms of regulation" would satisfy the governmental 
interest without infringing First Amendment rights. Sherbert, 
at 407. And see Barnett v. Rodgers, supra, at 1000; Teterud, 
supra, at 362; and Yoder, at 214-215, where the Court stated 
that "only those interests· of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion." 
! In performing the delicate analysis outlined above, 
l1 this court should keep in mind, above all else, the weighty values, I inherent in the First Amendment's religion clauses, of tolerance 
1 I I of diverse beliefs, the inviolability of conscience, the I 
I 
benevolent neutrality of government, freedom of choice, the 
accommodation of the spiritual needs of all people, and the 
promotion of diversity and pluralism. "Toward a Constitutional 
Definition of Religion," 91 Harv. L.R. 1056, 1058; Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); U.S. v. Ballard, supra; 
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sherbert, supra; 
u.s. v. Seeger, supra. "Promotion of diversity" has particular 
significance when Indian cultures and religions are at issue. 
Cherokee culture and religion has origins in the pre-history of 
. ! 
a people whose path of intellectual, philosophical and spiritual 
development has been, until very recent times, wholly different ( 
from our own, and even now, embodies a world view we must struggle\ 
. ! 
to comprehend. As the pressures of our technological and 
materialist society bear ever moreheavily upon such fragile 
remnants of other worlds, sensitivity to constitutional values 
commands that we be increasingly solicitous of their continued 
vitality, andgeneraJ;'lyof that "diversity we profess to ad.TTiire 
and encourage," Yodel!, at 226. As the California Supreme Court 
observed in Woody, supra, at.821-822, 
In a mass society, which presses at ev..:.ry point 
toward conformity, the protection of a self-
expression, however unique, of the individual 
and the group becomes ever more important. The 
II 
I 
'I 
varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater 
value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced 
an old religion in using peyote one night at a 
meeting in a desert hogan near Needles, California. 
The Affidavits submitted in this litigation by 
plaintiffs, medicine men and anthropologists in support of 
plaintiffs' complaint and.motions for temporary and preliminary 
injunctions clearly satisfy the necessary tests outlined above. 
The plaintiffs herein have established that their practices and 
beliefs are religious and that the plaintiffs are sincere in 
1 their beliefs. It is equally clear that the challenged 
,, 
II 
government actions, the excavation of Cherokee burial sites 
and the flooding of Cherokee sacred grounds, infringe the free 
I 
exercise of plaintiffs• religion. Moreover, as the voluminous 
federal government documents regarding the completion of the 
Tellico Dam attached as Exhibits to plaintiffs' pleadings show, 
II there is no "compelling state interest" to justify the alleged 
I First Amendment infringement. 
I 
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I 
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i i, ' 
I 
IV. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE FIFTH AMENDMENT LIBERTY 
INTEREST CLAIM. 
I 
l Defendant has totally misconstrued plaintiffs' claim under the Fifth 
I and Ninth Amendments. 
I! 
Despite the fact that defendant seems not be have the 
faintest idea of the right being asserted by plaintiffs under the Fifth and 
' 
II 
Ninth Amendments, they readily claim that plaintiffs lack standing to r.aise 
any constitutional rights due to a lack of property interest in the land at 
II 
II 
II 
issue. As discussed in the previous section plaintiffs are not required to 
assert a property interest in order to challenge on constitutional grounds, the 
use of public lands nor a statute authorizing that use. 
TVA .then denies plaintiffs have a liberty interest at stake. No 
tj' II reasons are given for this statement. A reading of Argument C in Plaintiffs' 
l MemorandumSin Support of Application for Temporary Relief and/or Preliminary 
Injunceion and the cases cited therein clearly show the contrary. Plaintiffs' 
liberty interest is protected by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
~ 
~ l 
tj 
I! 
,, 
II 
jl 
as reaJ together with the Ninth Amendment. This liberty interest en~omp~sses 
the zones of privacy created by the specific guarantees in the Bill or Rights 
and their penumbras. Thus, the Cherokee plaintiffs have a right to privacy 
protected by the liberty clause of the Fifth 'Amendment when read together with 
the Ninth Amendment which includes the right to choose to practice their 
ancient religion, their right to preserve the Cherokee culture and to raise 
their children in that culture. This privacy right asserted by plaintiffs will l 
be infringed by the actions of defendant pursuant to the mandate of Pub. L. 
96-69. The infringement can only be justified by a compelling state interest 
test. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). 
The failure of defendant to understand the nature of plaintifffs 
asserted Fifth Amendment liberty interest renders the cases cited by it 
I 
. I 
I 
! 
-I 
l Defendant TVA begins its analysis of pla~ntiffs First Amendment free 1 
L 
!' i! irrelevant and inapposite. 
ii 
,, 
I 
II 
II 
I 
I 
1. 
l: 
''·' 
exercise claim by stating that the religious freedom claim must fail because 
Congress or a federal agency is without restraints in its use of public lands, 
even if that use results in the disinterment of gravesites. Plaintiffs infer 
from TVA's argument that it is their contention that Cherokee gravesites are 
subject to the power of eminent domain. This claim is clearly irrelevant to 
the constitutional issues before this Court. 
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!I 
II I v. LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND WAIVER ARE NOI' A BAR TO THE ACTION SOUGH'l' 
BY PLAllfflFFS. 
II A. 
( MENT OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTI'IUI'IONAL RIQITS. 
ESTOPPEL AND LACHES MAY Nor BE INVOKl:D TO BA.~ AN ACTION ClAIMING INFPJNGE-
I T.V.A. invokes laches cmd estoppel in an attempt to validate an unconstitutional statute and to seek inmunity from constitutiona~ challengesl I to actions taken or planned which will result in First, Fifth and Ninth Amend-
!l 
't 
'I 
·j 
,, 
II 
II 
I 
I 
l 
II 
lj 
! 
,I 
,, 
I' 
.I 
I 
rrent violation. 'Ihis suit is based upon fundamental and preferred consti tu-
tional rights involving freedom of religion, -speech and association, freedom 
from arbitrary and discriminating federal action and the right to the equal 
protection of the laws. 1 
In a constitutional case of this nature, as opfX)sed to cases 
involving merely statutory rights, courts have been extremely relunctant to 
I per.mit.defenses of laches and estoppel. As to laches I the !v'l..assechuttes Supreme r 
! 
Court held in Sears v. Treasurer and P£ceiver General, 98 N.W.2d 621, ·632 (1951) 
that an unconstitutional law can not be nade valid by the laches of anyone or 
by any lapse of tine, and laches does not run against public rights. Nor riay 
the doctrine of estoppel be invoked to challenge a clearly unconstitutional 
action, Grill1am v. Jones, 3 So.2d 761 (1941). See also, Gimbel v. Peabody, 
179 A.62 (S.Ct. N.J. 1935), holding that actions to test the constitutionality 
of statutes in direction violation of the Constitution should be liberally 
granted. For exanple, in Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltinore, 78 F. 
Supp. 346 (D.M.D. 1948), the Court sU11lffi3.rily rejected an estoppeLdefense 
in a case involving racial discrimination. That case involved segregated 
public golf courses and the refusal of defendants to permit a black citizen I 
I 
i 
to golf on the white golf course. Defendants argued that the plaintiff was 
I estopped from bringing the case because the City had expended funds to improve 
1 tl1e negro golf course pursuant to an understanding with bluck golfers. 
IJ 
I 
I 
II 
I! 
Because of the fundarrental rights involved in Law, which are the sa:me rights 
involved in tl1is case, any lapse of tine or acquiescence of anyone will not 
inure to the benefit of those who flout the Constitution as to validate a 
patently unconstitutional statute. 
1. As discussed in Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of their injnnction /Vbtion, 
these constitutional rights are so funda:rrental as to call into play the 
"compelling state interest test." 
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In its Brief, T.V.A. argues that laches applies in this case, 
(T.V.A. Brief, pp. 22-24) and that estoppel should also upply (Id. p. 25). 
However, none of the cases cited by T.V.A. involve purely fundamental con-
tj stitutional claims. The cases relied upon by- T.V.A. do not apply here l:Jecause II 
'I II 
they involved statutory rights, and constitutional issues were never discussed, 
raised or considered; 2 did not involve a fundamental constitutional right;3 
I or rrerely involved a statutory cause of action where a state statute of l li limitations applied. 4 None of these cases justify the application of laches 
11 or estoppel in a case of this nature. 
d li 
,I !i !t 2. 
1.1 
Mansfield Area Citizens Group vs United States, 413 F.Supp. 810 (M.D. Pa. 
1976); Bales v. Fox, 403 F.Supp. 253 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Baskin v. Tennessee 
If 
11 Valley Authori!Y_, 382 F.Supp 641 (M.D. Tenn, 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d I 1402 (6th Cir., 1975); Clark v. Volpe, 342 F.Supp. 1324 (E. D. La.), aff'd., 
i 461 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir., 1972) Carney v. Smith, 437 S.W.2d 246 (Tenn. 1969); I 
d 11 Brown v. Dunston, 409 S.W.2d 365 (Tenn., 1966). 
r 
3. Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F. 2d 1111 (9th Cir.· 1971) : Laches Barred a clalin that 
! 
l 
l 
procedural due process rights were violated in a meeting which occured six years: 
l 
j before the case was filed. 
4· ~:rwin v. Neal, 494 F.2d 1351 (6th Cir. 1974) ., -The Tennessee Statute of 
Limita·tions does not bar this case for three reasons. First, T.C.A. 28-304 II . I does not by its terms apply to actions brought under 28 U.S.C. ~ 133l(a), II i 1343(3), 1362, 16 U.S.C. ~ 470 and 42 U.S.C. ~- 1996 (See Complaint, paragraph 4) t 
Second, assuming T.C.A. 28-304 could be construed to apply, then plaintiffs 
have already brought this action within "one (1) year from t..~e date of his in-
jury and under no circumstances shall his action be barred before he sustains 
an injury." Id. As flooding has not yet occurred, plail}.tiffs have not yet 
I sustained injury. M:>reover, actions for damages for disinte:rrnent of bodies 
llis not barred by the one year limitation of T.C.A. 28-304. Hill vs. Travelers 
!Insurance Co., 154 Terill. 295, (1927), 294 S.W. 1097 . 
. I . 
'! 
! 
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i 
I; 
' I I 
111 T. V .A. has shONn no rea<:on why this Court should deviate from the 
II rule that estoppel nay not nonnally be invoked to inure to the benefit of those·. 
l. who flout the constitution. At pages 24-25 of their Brief, T.V.A. intimates 
that failure to raise a religious claim in an amicuS Brief filed in a case 
1 
. ·involving the Endangered Species Act should somehow estop plaintiffs from 
jl bringing this action. T.V.A. also claims that their intrepretation of a 
letter concerning alleged acquiesence in a relatively limited undertaking 'I 
II 
'j 
I 
II 
ji 
·j 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
II 
I 
by the Eastern Band and certain non-parties to this case should justify such 
reliance by T.V.A., to its prejudice, so as to estop the bringing of this 
action. 5 It is clear that these alleged actions or waivers of plaintiffs' 
fundamental cor$titutional rights are insufficient to bar this case. Where 
a fundarrental constitutional right is at stake, waivers can be established 
only by clear and unequival proof, wherein t"lere is a presumption against 
waiver. Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, 198 n. 17 (1955). See also 
Boykin.v. ~~abama~ 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 
(1966); Williams v. State of Alabama, 341 F.2d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 196~); 
Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. vs. Redwine, 85 F.Supp. 749 1 752-753 (N.D. Ga. 
1949), rev'd. on other grd's., 342 U.S. 299. Waivers of fundamental constitu-
tional rights pa:rticularly can not be based up:m acquiesence or estoppel-type 
conduct on the part of third parties. Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 
433 n.32; Law v. Mayor and City Council of Baltirrore, supra; Del· .Mar Canning 
Co., v. Payne, 175 P.2d 231, 233 (S. Ct. calif., 1946). 
These assertions of fact are disputed by the parties and can. only be 
resolved at trial. See, Section IV · of this Brief. 
-30-
, , 
0 0 
, 
0 0 
, 
0 
O 
0 0 0 0 
, , , , , , , , • , , , , ,• , , , , , , , , , J' <' O, 0, o' I 0 • I • o· I j • , < < o <.'.I 0, o , I, •, • ,' ,' .', ·~ • , r,' , ',',',' 0' 'I' 
I 
I 
' If 
I· li II II 
,, 
II 
I 
I 
1. 
ll 
'I 
B. LAaiES OR ESTOPPEL IS Nor TO BE APPLIED WHERE IT WOULD 
FRUSTRATE IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICIES. 
Laches has been held not to be an .asse.rtable defense in those 
" 
II situations where such assertion would frustrate the purpose of (United States) 
t· laws, orthwart its public policy, Arrerican Surety Company of New York vs. ,, 
I' 
II 
ii ll 
n d 
li 
li 
II 
I' !' 
·I !: 
ll 
II 
United States, 112 F.2d, 903, at 906 (lOth Cir., 1940) [Laches could not be 
invoked or frustrate the policy to protect Indians wi tb respect to leases of 
coal lands.], Brooklyn Savings Bank vs. O'Neal, 324 U. S. 697, 89 L.Ed. 1297 
at 1307 [no v1ai ver of estoppel as to right of two liquidated darrages under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938], Oliver vs. Oliver, 185 F.2d 428 (D. C. Cir. 
1950) [estoppel and determination of validity of prior divorce decree, and 
subsequent cererronial rna.rriage]. 
I' 
ij Further, referenCe is :rrede by the plaintiffs to Scott Paper Company! 
1! 
II .. 
!I 
lt !I I, 
vs. Marcalus :Manufacturing Company, 326 U. S. 249 (1945) [Public policy be11.ind 
promotion of signs barred estoppel defense in a patent infringement case] ; 
Ernest vs. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, at 136 through 138 (1922) [policy to 
protect Indian lands ·from purchase by Federal officials] ; Envirornrental r 
l Defense Fund vs. Tennessee Valley Authority, supra [laches barred as a defense , 
l 
by public NEPA policies]; United States vs. Consolidated Mines and Smelting 
Company, 455 F.2d 432, 446 through 447 (9th Cir., 1971) [Public policy to pro-
teet Indian land and resources]; Oneida Indian Nation of Nev1 York v. County of 
Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527 at 542 throuah 543 (N.D. N.Y., 1977) [policy to pro-
teet Indian lands from U1.'leiuthorized sale barred the assertion of the defense of II 
II 
laches.] 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Envirorimental Defense Fund 
v. Tennessee Valley Authori:tY, supra, rejected the defense of laches with re-
gard to the one and one-half year delay between the effective date of the 
National Environrrental Proection Act and the filinc;r of the suit, stating at 
i I pages 1182 through 1183: 
"Consideration of the public interest also 
requires us to reject the defense of laches. 
The st::rong policy e.rrbodied in the NEPA ... 
mitigates· against· barring this suit on the 
ground of unreasonable dL~lay . . • [citation 
omitted] . • . The.r0 is also the public interest 
in requiring public officials to obey statu-
tory m:mdates . . . [citation omitt.ed]. These-
considerations explain in part why Courts havo 
not t~en receptive to foreclosing litigation 
-31-
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I 
on the issues in this appeal on the 
ground of the plaintiffs' delay in 
bringing suit." 
In Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, supra, 
after remand from the Suprerre Court, the Trial Court held that laches could 
not be raised to bar a suit brought by Indians for the recovery of damages 
for taking of land 175 years prior to the filing of the action, citing the 
embodiment of public policy in 25 U.S.C. Section 177. 
The instant case involves important national policies, and con-
siderations with regard to the protection and preservation of the religious 
and cultural, beliefs of the plaintiffs and their right to exercise the sam2, 
I
ll pursuant to the First Arrendrrent to the Constitution of the United States, 
in 42 U.S.C. ·1996. Furt,er, the instant case involves national policies I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
" 
I· 
!l 
I 
embodied in the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U. S. C. Section 470, 
et seq., and the public interest in requiring public officials to obey the 
nandates of those sections. Further, th~ inherent right of the Cherokee 
Indian Tribe to maintain itself as a distinct cultural corrmuni ty, and to 
preserve such a corrmunity as a distinct cultural entity free from interference 
from the respective states has been recognized in ~vorchester v. C-.eorgi.a, 6 
j Pet. (31 U.S.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), and People of Tbgi.ak vs. United States,/ 
i 470 F.Supp. 423 (D.C., 1979). The defense of laches should not be permitted to! 
frustrate these important public policies. 
C. THE DEFENDANT HAS FJI..ILED TO CAP~ ITS BURDEN TO ESTABLISH TfT..AT 
THE PlAINTIFFS ARE GUILTY OF ·TACHES Jll®/OR ES'IDPPEL. 
l. The defendant has failed to show that the required 
elerrents of laches and/or estoppel as a defense exists in this case. 
Initially, reference is made to Rank vs. (KRUG) United States, 
142 F. Supp. 1 (D. c. Ca., 1956) where, at page 128, the following is asserted 
as a reasonable definition of laches, and the elements thereof: 
"Laches is a neglect or failure on the 
part of a party in the assertion of a 
right, continuing for an urrreasonable 
and unexplained length of t.ilre, under 
circumstill1ces permitting diligence, 
resulting in a disadvantage to ti1e other 
party. [citations omitted]". 
Reference is further nade to California State Board of Ec1ualization vs. Coast 
Radio Products, 228 F.2d 520, wherein the following is set out, at page 525, 
as the definition of estoppel and the elements required for proof therein: 
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"An Estoppel arises where one party by 
concealment or false representation in-
1 tentionally deceives another party as to 
I the true staterrent of facts
 to the detri-
. :rrent of the second party. Fvur elenents ! t! are necessary: ( 1) the party to the 
1 estopped must k•·1CMT the facts; ( 2) He I must intend that his conduct shall be 
I acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to 
I believe it is so intended; (3) the latter ' must be ignorant of the true facts; and II (4) He must rely on the fonrer' s conduct 
n to his injury." 
!
II Further, as noted in ~ vs. (KRUG) United States, supra, at 128, the existence 
l 
1 of either or both laches and estoppel is a question of fact. 
li 
'I !, 
ll 
" 
, . 
. I 
!I 
., 
!: 
II 
II 
'I 
II 
II 
II jl 
.I 
II 
'I ,,
·I 
r 
I 
,I 
II 
I 
1!' I 
I 
Failure to show each and every element with regard to either 
laches or estoppel is fatal to the clai.Ired defense, Hampton vs. Param:mnt 
Pictures Corporation, 279 F~2d. 100, at 104 [no assertion of any fact by 
the plaintiff, and no reliance by the defendant] ; Gardner v. Panarra Railroad 
Conpan'y, 342 U. S. 29, 96 L.Ed. 31, 72 S. Ct. 12, [no unexcusable delay, 
and no prejudice shown); Gutierrez vs. Watterman Steamship Corporation, 373 
U. S. 206, 10 L.Ed. 2nd 297, 83 S. Ct. 1185 (1963) [delay found to be excusabl~ 
and no prejudice was shown as the d~fendant had access to the records con-
taining statements of the witnesses, and the details of the event, and the 
witnesses were available); Waldman vs. United States, 229 F~2d 99 (1st Cir., 
i 
I 
1956) [No reliance by the· defendant government asserted or shown.) An accurate i 
I 
picture of the role played by estoppel in the determination of rights is set 
out in~ vs. Tennessee Valley Authority, 216 F.2d 223, at 225 (5th Cir. 
1954), as follows: 
"In any event, estoppel is applied to pro-
note the ends of justice; can be used only 
as a shield to protect against injustice and 
not as a sword to as£ert a wrong of any 
character, •.• II 
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2. Plaintiffs have not. unreasonably delayed the bringing of this action. l 
i 
President Carter signee. to Eilergy aru1 I·Jater Appropriations Act on i 
Septerrber 25, 1979. That Act directs TVA to carrplete the Tellico Project. 
Plaintiffs filed suit on October 12, 1979, challenging the constitutionality 
of the Act and 'lVA' s actions taken pursuant to that Act. Clearly this action 
is tirrel y, and the relevant date to detennine whether a claim is stale is 
the circumstances which exist at the elate of the filinlJ of the action. In 
this instance, the circmnstances shew that on October 12, an alleged 
unconstitutional law had recently been enacted and T\i'A was in the process 
of taking or planning actions which would result in abridgement of plaintiffs' 
constitutional rights. Prior to that elate, as a result of plaintiffs' 
efforts, T\7A had not flcxx1ed the area, grave descretion had ceased, and T\lA 
had carrn:nitted itself to reinter remains of Cllerokee bodies which had 
previoUsly been rerroveCI .. 
3. In order to be free from laches which bars those ·who sleep on their 
rights, plaintiffs were not required to file this action before CX:tober 12, 197'!l. 
Defendahts claim that this action \-las re:ruirec to have been brought 
in 1965: ! 
" plaintiffs' claims were barred by laches 
twelve years ago. ': I TVA reasons that plaintiffs had notice in 1966 that funds 1 
! 
(TVA Brief, p .. 24). 
were appropriated for Tellico and that in order to avoid laches a la~Uit was 
I 
i• 
l required to be filed at that tLte. TVA intimated that plaintiffs' delay in 
t filing suit was aresult of a lack of diligence which caused de£enc1ant to take , 
action to its prejudice: 
". . • parties cannot thus sit back while over $111 
million is spent on on construction of a project 
over a >:>eriocl of 13 years and then . . . seek to 
halt,. i.t on the basis of religious claims advanced 
for the first tine. " 
I 
·I 
I 
(Id. p. 23) The record. shows that plaintiffs asserted their religious clairos I 
in 1965* and TVA acD:nits that plaintiffs pursued this claim through various 
means continually** 
* See TVA Brief pp. 4, 5; Lesesne Af~. at 5-6 and Exhibit 4) 
** TVA Brief pp. 4,5,6-10,11; Lesesne Aff. at 9; John Crowe Affs., Johnathon 
E. Taylor. 
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In the factual circumstances of this case, involvement by plaintiffs 
in litigation prior to 1977 is not a requirenent to avoid laches. In 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1918), more than twenty-uvo 
years elapsed since the wrong corrplained of was conmitted. During that 
pericxl of t.irre plaintiffs had opposed that wrong through various rrethcxls 
I 
l.~oreover, I' including protests, supporting litigations unc.er various theories. I 
1 
the theory reliec1. upon by plaintiffs in Southern Pacifi:c was raisec1 for the 
1j first t.irre upon the filing of that case .. The Supreme Court rejected the 
;I 
, 
l 
defense of laches on the grounds that rrere lapse of tine and failure to file 
a law8uit were insufficient under t...he facts of that case, which is very 
si!Pilar· to the Olerakee in facts: 
!bre than twenty-two years had thus elapse since the 
wrong carrplained of v-Ias committed. But the essence of 
laches is not rrerely lapse of tine. It is essential 
that there also be acquiescence in the alleged wrong, 
or a lack of diligence in seeking a rerredy. Here 
plaintiffs, or others representing t...hem, protested 
as soon as the terms ... were announcec.; and ever 
since they have wit.~ rare pertinacy, and undaunted 
by failure, persisted in the diligent pursuant of a 
remedy, as the sc...~edule of the earlier litigation 
referred to •.. derronstrate. li'lhere the cause of 
action is of such a nature that a suit to enforce 
it would be brought on behalf not only of the plaintiff, 
but all person silllilarly situated, it is not essential 
that each rson intervene in the suit broucrht in order 
that e rray be dee..rr,ed tJ: ereafter free from .._ e laches 
which bars those who sleep on their ri hts. (Citation 
omitted . Nor does the failure, long continuecl., to 
discover the appropriate remedy, though well known, 
establish laches 'Where there has been due diligence, 
and . • . the defendant was not prej udiceCl. by the 
delay. " (Errphasis added) 
Id. pp. 488-489. 
Here, the Olerokees made their clairos known to TVA and diligently 
pursued a variety of remedies to protect their relisrious and cultural 
rights, including petitions, protests, support of litigations, a."Dicus briefs, 
tribal council resolutions and consultations with TVA. Under Southern Pacific,! 
I 
the Olerokees were not required to intervene in all the conti..Tluous litigations l 
I 
brought again.st TVA which sought ot halt the Tellico Projct, because where ! 
causes of action under NEPA and NHPA were: 
"of such a nature that a suit to enforce (thern v.;ere) 
brought on behalf not only of the plaintiff, but all 
persons si.mil~ly situat.ed, it is not essential that 
-35-
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(Olerokees) intervene in Llte suit brought in order 
that (they) may be deemed thereafter free from to 
laches which bars those who sleep on their rights." 
Id. at 489. Not only does the rec'Ord shcm- that plaintiffs were diligent in 
pursuing their remedies, but, as discussed below, TVA has made absolutely 
no showing that it changed its course of action on the Tellico Projct solely 
because of the fact that this case was not filed until 1979. 
i 
I I. For the above reasons, TVA's assertion that plaintiffs \"le..re required 1 
II to bring this action in 1965 in erronEDus. Additionally, it is inporta...11t I 
'j to rerrerrber that plaintiffs' causes of action alleged in its corrplaint based 
I upon 42 U.S.C. 1996 and 16 U.S.C. 470 et sa;. did not arise until 1978 and _ _..... ~~ 1976 1, respectively. It is basic that there can be no laches in failing 
il to bring a cause of action \f.lhen no cause of action exists. Pratt v. Pratt, 
I 
I 96 u.s. 704 < 
i 
) . fureover, as o;f January 31 of 19 77, plaintiffs' claims 
l were Ihx>ted by the penranent injunction issued in '1-vA v+ Hill, supra. 
II· 
r 
II 
I 
I 
I 
1/ See 15 U.S.C. 470 f. (Septerrber 1976). 
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l 4. Defendant has ·faiied to show that ·it Relied up:::>n Plaintiffs 
delay to their prejuaice .· 
allegeq 
A party who invokes the ~octrine of esto~>el must have acted to 
I 
I 
i 
bis detrinent in reliance upon what the other party has done, and such reliancei 
must be reasonable, and based on a representation by the other party, Hel ving 
vs. Schine Chain Theatres, 121 F.2d 948, Horning v. McAlenan, 149 F.2d 561, 
cert. den. 66 S. Ct. 142, 326 U.S. 761, 90 L.Ed.2d 458, and U. S. vs. McCue, 
178 F.Supp. 426. Estoppel arises where one, by his conduct, lulls aYJ.other 
into a false security, and into a position he would not have taken only be-
! 
I 
I 
I 
' I I 
cause of such conduct, McWaters and Bartlett vs. U. S., For Use And Benefit of : 
'I 
II 
I! Wilson, 272 F. 2d 291 (C.A. 
II 
I 
1960) , and es·toppel must involve some kind of 
II 
II 
.I 
r 
! 
II I! I, 
I 
I 
! 
!, 
l 
reliance or change of position to the detriment of ~~e person who asserts the 
defense of estoppel, Bach vs. Perkins, 223 F.2d 251 (C.A. 9th Cir., 1955) cert.~ 
den. 76 S. Ct. 206, 350 U.S. 918, 100 L.Ed. 804. 
In the instant case, no mention of reliance to tl1e detriment, 
no change of position, and no assertion that the sarre exists is IPade by the 
defendant because the defendant suffered no prejudice, nor change of position, 
nor did the defendant act, based on any reliance with regard to t.he plaintiffs·: 
position at all; rather, as evidenced by the Statement of Facts in both "tt~e 
Brief and supportive M::>tion for Surrmrry Judgme..nt, and the State of Facts 
contained herein, the defendant Tennessee Valley Authority proceeded at all 
times not enjoined with construction, irrespective of the wishes of anyone. 
D. EXISTING DISPU'IES AS TO BATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDE. THE 
GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMEl\JT ON THE ASSERI'ED IAOlES, OR ESTOPPEL, DEFENSE. 
To avoid repetitiveness, reference is hereby rrade to the statement! 
i 
of facts contained in this response for the rraterial issues of act which are j 
I 
in dispute at this time, and further reference is rrade to the discussion of · 
the required criterion for consideration of summary judgment as further found 
in this response. Further, the defense of estoppel has been held to be 
available, in a posture to be o..._~tennincd, at the time of trial, and should. not I 
, 
II be tile subject of a Motion to Dismiss, Glus vs. Brooklyn Eastern District 
II Tennina1, 359 U. s. 231, 3 L.Ed.2d 770, 79 s. Ct. 760 (1959). 
I, 
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VI. PUBLIC 'LAW 96-69 OOES NOI' REPEAL THE CONSTITUTIONl\L RIQiTS OF 
PLAINTIFFS NOR DID IT REPEAL Tllli PROI'ECTIONS AFFORDED PLAINTIFFS BY 'll-IE 
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS P.CT OR THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATIOf·J ACT. 
In the Complaint and supporting memorandu~, Plaintiffs alleged 
that completlQP of the Tellico Dam by TVA would violate nurrerous laws which 
. had not been repealed by the Tellico Atendment to the 1980 Water Appropriation~ 
I 
Act. Plaintiffs concede that the Endangered Species 1\ct v1as expressly repealed 
with respect to the Tellico Project, but contend that all other laws which do 
not conflict with the amendment are still in full force and effect. This 
contention is supported by the well-developed judicial doctrine that an 
implied repeal of a statute may only be based upon a clear repugnancy between 
an old and a new law and upon a clear and manifest intent to repeal the old 
law . .MJrton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 539, 549 (1974). This doctrine applies 
with ":eull vigor when the legislation is an appropriations rreasure." TVA v. 
·I Hill, 437 u.s. 153, 190 (1978). 
II 
I' 
jl 
II 
II 
r II 
II 
,I 
ll 
I' 
II 
II 
'I 
Defenda~t TVA attempts to dispose of this doctrine in their Brief 
by relying on United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940), arguing that 
Congress has 'the authority to repeal prior laws t.cl-rrough an appropriations act. 
t 
I {TVA Brief, p. 27) • Havvever, the Dickerson rationale is readily distinguishabl~. 
' Dickerson involved the question whether a soldier was entitled to a re- enlist~ 
i 
' 
ment bonus when an approp~iation rider had suspended such bonuses for one year l 
"notwithstanding portions of § § 9 and 10" of the act. 310 U.S. at 555. 
Unlike the present case, in Dickerson, the Court found an abundance of legis-
lative history specifically clarifying the new law and its eA~ress repeal 
of the prior statute. The rider in Dickerson specified the precise law to be 
repealed and even imposed a specific tirre lirni tation for the repeal. l;lso, 
Dickerson involved the repeal of an appropriations bill by another appro-
priations bill. The Cherokee case involves statutes which are totally un-
related and contains no specificity beyond the Endangered Species Act. 
pickerson simply does not stand for a repeal, express or irrrplied, of "all 
other lu.ws 11 and TVA's reliance on this case is misplaced. 
For a discussion of the law regarding repeal of substantive legislation by 
general language in appropriations measures, see Plaintiffs original Mennran-
dum at pages 33-41. 
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II A. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TELLICO AMENDMENT OOES ~~OT II !' INDICA'IE ANY INTENT BY THE PROPONENTS OF THE N1ENDMENT TO PEPEAL THE RELIGIOUS : 
11 FREEIXJM ACT OR HISTORICAL PRESER'ilATION AC'r. II 
!l 
II 
II 
!I 
II 
II 
I' !l 
" 'l ,, 
.I 
II I, 
ll 
il 
II 
ii r 
' Defendant TVA relies heavily on five quotations in the legislative I 
history of Tellico Legislation to show the clear and express intent of Congress: 
to repeal "all other laws" , (TVA Brief, pp. 28-29) Howe\er, these quotations 
are misleading. 
First, all five quotations are from the Senate Floor debates and 
nothing is quoted from the House of Representatives. This does not constitute 
a clear and express showing of the entire Congress to repeal "any ot..l-Jer law." 
I Second, three of t..'l.e Sena·te quotations took place on July 17, 1979,\ 
'When the Sena,te voted to defeat a propJsed Tellico arrendment, statements . of 
Senators Heinz, Chaffee and.Culver. See 125 Cong. Rec •. S9671 {July 17, 1979) . 
'Ihese camrents are irrelevant to the . debate and larl'Juage approved by the 
Senate on September 10, 1979. The corrments of Senator Chaffee and CUlver that 
TVA quoted from that date, were stat:rrents of opponents to the Tellico amend.llent; 
' See 125 Cong. Rec. Sll,279 and Sl2,275 {Daily Ed. Sept. 10, 1979). Since those; 
' two Senators were leaders of the op:r::osi tion to the aroendment, their statements 
11 
'I II 
II carmot be construed as expressing t.lie clear and rra.'1ifest intent and purpose 
t 
II 
of the Congress in passing the amendrrent. 
l B. THE APPROPRIATIONS ACT AJ."vJENDME[\J'T OOES NOT REPEAL PROI'ECTIONS 
Gt.J]\ ..RM:ilTEED BY THE CONSTITJTio:t\1. 
Plaintiffs contended in their initial .Menorandurn that to find a 
repeal of "all other laws" could give rise to problems of constitutional 
rnagni tude, relying upon D. C. Federation of Civil Associations, Inc. v. Volpe, 
1 
434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Following the Volpe rationale, such a repeal 
by the arrend:ment would create two classes of persons. First, the Cherokees, l having a direct interest. in the Tellico Project, w~uld be denied the benefits I l of all the repealed laws together \vi t.h t.he substantive and procedural protection~ I 
I ll derived from them. Second, all other Arr.erican Indians not directly affected by l 
~the 'I'ellico project. 
,. 
I 
' 
~ Defendant 'IVA atternpted ·to discred.i t · Volpe. through a de.rlial of ~ 
\ certiorari by Chief Justice Burger. HCJVJever, it is very clear that t.t~e denial I 
II of certiorari has no precedential value. "Statements in opinions where courts i 
I -40-,, 
' ' ' . : ~ 
i 
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l 
indulged in generalities that had no actual bearir1g on issues involved were 
obiter. 11 Graham v. Jones, 3 So.2d 761, 774 (S.Ct. La. 1941). As the Sixth 
Circuit stated in McCrea v. Jackso~, 148 F.?d 193 (1945): 
The Suprerre Court has said that 11 the denial 
of a writ of certiorari imparts no expression 
of opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told mmy times . 11 United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490; Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401, 403, 404; W.P. 
Brown & SonsLurrber Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 82 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir.). 
To the contrary, the Volpe, case vias later cited with approval 
I in a per curiam opinion in Committee For Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. 
1\ II 
I 
ll 
!, 
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (C. D. Cir. 1971). 
c. 
But it is well settled that repeal by implica-
tion is disfavored, and the doctrine applies 
with full vigor wnen, as here, the subsequent 
legislation is an· appropriations measure, and 
when the prior Act is to continue in the general 
applicability, as construed by the courts, but 
the claim is made that it is. to be subject to a 
particularized legislative exception. 
RULES OF STATUIDRY CO'JSTRUCTION PEOUIRE THE COURT m CONS'T'RJJE I STATUTES AS CONSISTENT WHEN POSSIBlE. 
,, 
ll I 
The attempted rebuttal by 1~ is clearly ineffectual. To deprive 
these Plaintiffs of the benefit of "all other laws", such <ctS the ..A.rrerican 
Indian Religious Freedom Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, the 
Tennessee Graveyards Act, and perhaps nurrerous other laws, could indeed raise I serious constitutional problems. The nethod clear 1 y preferred by the courts 
1 is to read the Tellico Arrendrrent so as to allow it to co-exist with those pre-
\ vious enactrrents no·t in direct conflict vli th tlle amendrrent : 
I 
I 
I 
II 
[W]hen one interpretation of a statute would 
create a substantiaJ donbt as t.o thP statute's 
constitutionaL validity, the courts will avoid 
that interpretation absent a "clear staterrent" 
of a contrary legislative intent. When a statute isfairly subject to a variety of interpretations 
all but one of which would make it unconstitutional, 
then the courts must presurre Congress intended 
the interpretation which is constitutionally 
permissible. * * * Thus if appellee's inter-
pretation of the Court Heform Act would produce 
an unconstitutional result, there is at leas·t 
a strong pr:L'1E facie argunent that the inter-
pre-tation is erroneous. (Citations omitted.)-
United States v. 'lhompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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D. NON-CCMPI.AINCE OF TVA W~TH NATIONAL HIS'IDRI_C PRESERVATION 1\Cl' 
DEPRIVES PLl-\...INTIFFS OF SUBSTAl\ITIVE HTGHTS. 
l The 'IVA claims it has e~'{})ended IIDre than $3 Jvl.illion on Restoration· 
! 
projects in an attempt to explain their non-compliance. with § 106 of the 
National Historic Preservation Act. But the fact renuins that TVA is presentlY; 
l in blatant and clear violation of this federal law. See Affidavit of Walter R.j 
I 
Echo-Hawk. Section 106 of the Act requires that federal agencies afford the ! 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation an opportunity to corrment on any 
federal action affecting properties included in or eligible for inclusion in tlie 
National Register. 16 U.S.C. §470£. See \-Y'eintraub v. Rural Electrificat.ion 
Adrrunistration, 457 F.Supp. 78, 81 (M.D. Penn. 1978). In a letter to Mr. 
Echo-Hawk, one of the attorneys for Plaintiffs, dated October 23, 1979, and 
attached hereto as Exhibit NN , Mr. Ibn Kliroa of the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation, stated that: 
"With regard to a .fourth property, the 17,000 
acre Tellico Archeological District, determined 
to be eligible for inclusion in the National 
Register of Historic Places by the Secretary 
of the Interior, info.rrred discussions have taken 
place between t11e Council and the Tennessee 
Va.Uey Authori t:y, but a for.rral request for 
COrrin.'::!nt has not been received by the Council. 
The TVA has· not complied with the require.:rrents of the Act but they 1 
urge an interpretation of the Tellico arrendrrent which would exempt them from I 
the requirerrents of the text. Plaintiffs contend that to do this would 
frustrate public policy, expecially when the Act can be read to co-exist with 
the Tellico arrendrrent. 
For authority holding that denial of protections afforded by the 
National Historic Preservation Act is denial of a Slbstantial legal interest, 
see Aluli v. Brcw.n, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Haw. 1977), where the Court held 
the Navy's use of Kahoolowe Island as a borrbing range violated NEPA <md ~HPA. 
I That case was similar to the Cherokee case in that the bombing range included ! 
! 
' I "50 archeological sites, includin::r Hel:~o (places of worship of ancient Hawaiians~ fishing shrines, house foundations, caillpsites, [and] burial places. "i 
j 
I 
I 
11 437 F. Supp. at 605. 
I 
I 
ll 
_.( 
E. OIHER ARGLJri1ENTS OF 'IV!\ C.."IAIIvliNG BLANIZET RF.J'EAL OF IJI,WS BY 
TElLICO 1\MENDHENT ARE SPECIOUS. 
TVA also argues that Plaintiffs have no rights which have been 
denied by a blanket repeal of all laws. (TVA Brief, p. 29.) TVA maintains 
I 
l 
l 
j 
II 
I 
l 
I 
' 
I 
! 
I 
that the Am2rican Indian Religious Freedom Act is of no effect (TVA Brief, 
p. 30.); and that the Tennessee grave statute is rendered inapplicable by 
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
Despite TVA's contentions, the Plaintiffs do have statutorJ 
rights which would be violated if the Tellico arnp_ndment is constl-ued to 
repeal "all laws". Such violations could reach constitutional dimensions, 
although this result is not necessarJ if the ai"flel"l.dment and other laws are 
capable of co-existence. Such is clearly the case here. Congress knows how tq 
specifically repeal its own actions, as was illustrated by the Dickerson case 
above. However, since Congress did not choose to do so in the Tellico 
amendment, all previous laws not in conflict should be read to still be in 
full force. 
TVA's belief that 42 U.S.C. §1996 has no effect in this case is 
apparently based on L"leir misapprehension that the act can not be relevant 
because it fails to require specific TVA action or changes in specific TVA 
policies or practices. Plaintiffs have never claimed .that 42 u.s.c. § 1996 
imposes specific changes upon the TVA. But rather, s 1996 protects Plaintiffs' 
~ 
rights from federal infring~~t because it defines and &cplifies Indian First; 
II 
I 
ll jli Arrendment rights and protections and established an express federal pJlicy, 
based on a compelling state interest, to protect and preservTe native 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II ~,, 
religious freedom and cultural integrity. To repeal 42 u.s.c. § 1996 obviouslY, 
I 
l 
I 
would deprive Plaintiffs of these protections. 
TVA also summarily maintains that the Supremacy Clause renders 
the Tennessee Statutes inapplicaule as well. Certain of these statutes, such 
i 
as the TeP.nessee Graveyard Act, T.C.A. §46-401 et. seq., were enacted pursuant; 
! 
to the police pc:wer of the state. In detennining whether a state regulation 
has been pre-errpted by federal action: 
"the intent to supersede the e.."<ercise by 
the State of· its police fl(lWer as to natters 
not covered by t'f)e Federal Iegislation is not 
to be inferred from the nere fact that Congress 
has se~~ fit to circurrGcrh~e its reqJlation and 
to occupy a limited field." Huron Portland 
Cerrent eo., v. Detroit, 362 u-:-s:--440,443 (1960). 
Even though Congress gave its approval to exerrpt t..."l.e Dam from the 
Endangered Species Jl.ct, it seems unlikely that it rreant to pre-empt the fOlice 
:paver of the State of 'I'ennessee to regulate grave yards. Such an action I would constitute a dangerou.s precedent to override state authority ~,,,j_ th no 
I ~onsidcration bejng given to the st.ate. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out above, the plaintiffs would assert that n II j! the defendant is not entitled to the Summary .Judgrrent urxm the equitable 
II 
I 
I 
l 
·I 
II 
II 
II 
I 
'I li 
I 
l 
doctrine, or doctrines, or laches or estoppel. 
This the 25th day of October, 1979. 
Ben Oshel Bridgers / 
/ 
HOLT, HAIRE & BRIDGERS, P ·If/ 
50 West J.·E.in Street 
P.O. Box 248 
Svlva, Nort.l-l Carolina 
(704) 586-2121 
28779 
Robert M. Stivers, Jr. . 
LEIB01iJITZ f ~'IA'l'SON f KRf'::.SSIN I 
703 C'...ay Street, s .rv. 
Kno~~lle, Tennessee 37902 
(615) 637-1809 
Walter Echo-Hawk 
NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHI'S FUND 
1506 Broadway 
Boulder, Colorado 80302 
(303) 447-8760 
STJVERS & ERICKSON 
_u~~ 
Kurt. Blue r.oa ;.'l" 
NATIVE AJI·:ERICAN FIGHTS f:&:m 
1506 Broadway 
Boulder, Colorade 80302 
J .{J . .f R_ LA 
--+--- < 
Ellen Lei tzer 
NATIONAL ThiDD\L'J YOUI'H COL'NCIL 
201 Herrrosa 
Alht.querque, Ne-w Mexico 87108 
(505) 266-7966 
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COUNI'Y OF :I<.N)X 
I, lbbert M. Stivers, Jr., one of the counsels for the plaintiffs, 
do hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered by. hand a true and exact 
copy of the foregoing resr:onse to the Honorable Herbert S. Sanger, Jr. , 
11 General Connsel, Tennessee valley Authority, Knoxville, Tennessee, 37902. 
I· II 
I WI'INESS rey hand t..l-Iis 1ft'"# day of October, 1979. 
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1346 CONNC:r.TH~UT I\ VENUE, N.W. (not d~t~d--poutmnrked 12-19-72] SUITE :111 WASHINGTOrJ. D C. 20036 
{Hi!JJUtlU·Jtrt:r:.J 
202-223-4155 
NCAI OFFICERS 
PRESIDENT 
Leon F. Cook 
RM Loilce Chtppew~ 
FIR.ST VICE·PRES10ENT Ronnie Luoe 
11\.'hittr Mounratn A,?ar.he 
TREASURER 
H!!ll!r'l Motc:hell 
Duin.tult 
RECOP.C!NG SECRETARY Vernonsca Murdo.:!( 
Moja~ll! 
EXECUTIVE DIR£CTOR LP.O w. v ')CU 
()giB/oi SIOUX 
ABERDEEN AREA 
Alvin.J Grey 8edr 
StJnding Rock Siou:c 
ALASKA ARE~ 
Donald Wrigt·t 
Athabascan 
ANADARKO AREA Mary McCorm«:k 
·&<:&Fox 
BILLINGS AREA 
JimEiv 
Flathud 
GALLUP AP.EA 
Viclor Sarrocono 
L.llgun• Pueblo 
MINNEAPOLIS AREA Georq<!! Goodwin 
Chippewa 
MUSKOGEE ARF.;.'A K;atharine Whstrl 1rn 
Os;}fle 
PHt)l'fllJ')( Ani=A 
tser.son (.jobson 
S!loshontf 
PORTLANO AREA 
Waltrr Moffett 
Nu Perce 
SACRAMENTO AREA 
Erin Forr~t 
P1tt R•~•r 
•' 
' 
Honorable Aubrey J. Wagner Ch81rr::a.n 
'l'er:nesee Valley Authority Woodi\'a!'d Build:ing ~·Jashington, D. C. 20444 
Dear tv'!!' • Cbainnan: 
Fnclo~ed for your 1nforrration is a copy of the resolutic•nz adopted by the National Congress of i\.rnerica..'1 Indians during 1 ts 1972 arnual convention in Sar2sota, Florida on October 15-20, 1972. These resolutions, as supplerr.en'ced by action:> of 'ct1c t·JCAI Executive Council and Executi Vf;; Ccmn.i t tee, wi 11 f]..tide NCAI and its staff in thc- com..i::g ye:rr in C3.!T'J; 'lC; out its rc::::;pcr~•l!Yi.li ty i:u tl:c I:-:dj~ .. tt p.:~ple. 
We would appreciate it ver<./ mJch if you would rev1ew, in par-ticular, Resolutions No. 72- 19 --~--------------------------·--~-----We respectfully request· that your office or ~::;ency 5ndicate · your position on these resolutions and \<lhat action can be taken by you 1.'1 this regard. 
~ ', 
/\SyjcerelyJC4rs, ~e..J~w-:.CStj ~~~ .... 
Charles E. Trirr.ble Executive Director 
.. '·,·; ;.'. ·, 
; .. '' :.~~ 
',:.,_.._..:.._,•, 
rriiE EASTEHN BANJ> ()F CIIEH(H~EE INDIANS 
t.~t .Ill .. I t!t 1/ 'N/JAUY I 1'. 0. BOX ·l:i.•. Clli'.ROh..EE. N.C. ~1!71!1 • I'IIONE • ·;11 I• ·I'JI-D71. ·1!1"/--1771 
Jnllll i\ ( :111\\'f' 
l'u"' 'I'"' r '"' 1 
:\1\'irt E. Sntith 
l'it t•-l.'hit'{ 
. \lin· Larrtlll'rl 
.-lt!lllilli,fllltil•e A.tttt/anl 
ft·rnlll., l'a1 k•·r 
·J·:~-,-, utit•t! Ad''""' 
f{ulu-rt lil.tnk .. ll:-ilip 
Trihal/'luntlf'l 
.Jtllll' :'\l.ddnll,lllo 
I '{/1• , . . l!tlllo.:•' 
l'.tltin.t St11itl1 
I·.'DA s,, "''(" .1' 
May 31, 1977 
!\ldd~t·d .lt-·-,;111 
''"'"fflllt'lil tlf/11 ,., 
.',IJirln ( :rowt· 
Ht•, <'jt!IU/Il.l/ 
PlAINTIFf'S 
EXHIBIT f?.O 
\ ''-
Dear Pro< am Dir~ctor: 
Our 
a DUll t tht 
I nd i tJII'> 
object i or 
was not I 
groups, 
successf 
construe 
fish C<JI 
Now 
are dSS i < 
1E::I I i co 
to "Save 
three-in 
Sna it Da 
fn ths 
must b·.' 
g the past year, I have received a considerable amount of information Tellico Darn Project. As you know, tho F,Jslern Band of Cherof\ee 
J iced rf)() i r opposition to th i<; construction <J<j tMr I y d'• 19 II. Our 
; to the dustruction of cert<~in h!sl·orfc ~i-t-es in Tellico Plains 
eded, dnd in tho years following, the objections of conser-vation i ldl ife org,mL::ations and environmental agencies were 'equally un-
1. In January, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appea Is ha I ted 
the dam due to the existence of an endangered speciu~ of Sndi I lJarter which I ives in the Little Tennessee River-. 
a number of groups that have opposed this TVA project in past years t i nq the E-.ndanqered Species Cornm i ttee in their fight tu h.we the jm Project h~lted permanently. The reason tor this growinq support he Snai I Darter" is not completely due to their concern for a fish. The practical rea~on is this: The laws that protect the 
at:compl ished a near-miracle by stopping a TVA project. 
the halt in construction is permanent, immedidte plans 
veloped for the use of Tel I leo Plains. 
Thi is why I would I ike to encourage you to support the Endangered Species Committe in ·their e.fforts to permanently halt the Tellico Dam .Project. All of f"he g ·ups present I y opposing the project have informed us that they are 
especial interested In developing a plan which includes the interests of the Cherokee~ . If 'fie assist in the fight to "Save the Sna !I Darter," we w i I I have the opf->o hmily tu !Jurticipdi'e In uevulopin~ an alh:Hndle f->lun. 
On, Hlt~ lOth, a conference will be held at the Hoiiday Inn for the purpose 
of provi ing our people with information about He Tellico Dam Project. I would I ike to courage you to attend this meeting.. In addition to discussing the . propos3d estruction of historic sites of the Cherokees, the speakers wl I I be 
especi3 inierested in meeting the Cherokee people and discussing plans for develop.r J Tel I ico in a manner that is in keeping with its natural and historic value. l assisting in the fight to "Save the Snai I Darter," we may accomplish 
a greate goal: We n~y save Tel I ico Plains. 
Sincerely, 
(·L·--/~"' !l c.'~-~~"'zc.---L 
Jolljn A. Crowe, Principal Chief 
EASTEHN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS 
I'IUB:\1. COliNCII. , EMIIEKS: 
l••il;.tthan 'lo~y! •• r. C:hail 11111: ll.tll ~I'C")'. l'iu>-C:haiwwn: GNanl Parkn. Nt•WJilall Anw.u·b, B.·nlla s .......... ~. •.• l{u~ lllallk<·n,IJip, Jnl.u (:, St .... dllll.(· ,!n'l', \\'ilbur St'<fll")·•h TJ& .. ,n.h r.. .. ,J,,.,,, B.&ilt•)' Colt'111an, Cilliau& Jad""n, .Jr..- Brat!lt·y, Cl&arks E. Cr:tig, /loo1 .. \l<tnh111; E~<g<·JH· l.illlt·j .. hn, l•111it" 1 ,· Sht•Jinan (;,.,., ·, .\f,.,.,.,,,:n. \\ ...... ,a!. l>il\h, l~11giish C/o/..; Maggi•· \Var!lat·laa, llltilll!l C/.-rA; l'vta•k l{,·,·d, lillf'I/Jtl'ln. . ' 
- ··-~-------;-.--... --:-----~--..--~-p-. 
. . 
• 
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NORTII CAROLII~A 
~WAIN COUNTY 
I, JOIIrJ A. CROWE, being duly swam, depose and say: 
AFFIDAVIT 
PlAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
00 
That I am an enrolled member of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. 
I was Principal Chief of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in 1974. 
s i uned on September 13, 1974 and forwurded a letter to Mr. Edward H. 
Lesesne in response to a request by TVA for an answer from the Tribe 
as to a propos a 1 made by TVA previously to Tribal Council for some 
reconstruction to take place at Chota. The reconstruction would con-
sist of the Chota Townhouse and dwelling, certain 'land improvements, 
and reintPrment of disposed Indian graves. 
I wi~h to emphasize that any action on the part of Tribol Council or 
myseH was not approval of the Tellico Dan Project. This letter was 
written at the request of TVA and it was rny understanding that should 
it not be written that TVA would take no action whatsoever to pre-
serve any Cherokee sites or graves. In all meetings _with TVA officials 
including Mr. Edward Lesesne, it was made perfectly clear that any 
projects the Tribe talked about relative to the flooding of the valley 
were on a worst case basis and to be undertaken only as a last resort. 
During 1974, TVA would not discuss any alternatives for development 
not consistent with their goals to flood the valley. 
I would like to make clear that excavations in the Tellico Dan Project, in 197 , 
sponsored by the'Cherokee Historical Association was not sanctioned by 
the Eastern Band· of Cherokee Indians: In fact it was during this period 
that the Tribe registered its strongest opposition with TVA, the press, 
and the Governor of Tennessee about the indignity associdted with the 
handling of Cherokee graves. I made personal trips to the Tellico area 
and to the University of Tennessee to register my opposition. Any indi-
vidua1 Tribal members who participated in excavations at Tellico did so 
on their own and not with the permission of the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians. 
t 
Be it further poi11ted out that Worth Cireene who ~upervised some 
excd tiun~ is not a member of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. 
I dec an~ under penalty of perjury that the ftwegoi IHJ is true and 
corr t. il1 is tlw 25th day of October 1979. 
Seal 
---· --- -- .... -- . ~ ---.l.~-------
I' .I
...; 
• PLAINTIFF'S NOIHII C ROLl N/\ 1\rF IOAV IT ( EXHIBIT 
S~~l\ f N Ct JNTY 
! _e_p ~ ---
t: 
1. ,1()1!: \lfl/\ri 1/\Yl'l~', ueing duly sworn depw;i' and '>dy: 
That I 1 an enrolled member of the Easten Band of Cherokee Indians, 
enro11m t number ?368, and my blood deqree is 7/16. 
rhut on ·epl. tJ, l'l/4 was a memb2r of Tribdl Counci I repre<;cnlinq the 
Wolfe T n Township. That during said Council meeting I moved thJt Gill 
Ledford, John cr·owe, and Bob Blankenship be authorized to wo1~k ur d formal 
request or th<~ artifacts recovered by TVA from the T1'llico D<.1m Projt>ct 
be disr>l yerl for tht' Cherokee Museum and instructing TVA to r·eintt:n: 
dislurbe indidn graves in the indi~n way. That no other action was taken 
on this ay to approve the plans for reconstruction of facilities at 
Chotd. wish·to futher state that since the early seventies I have objected 
strongly as a men1ber of Tribal Council and as an individual the manner in 
which TV handled the indian graves. my· objections continued from the early 
seventie to the oresent time. That on one occassion TVA did make a presentation 
to counc 1 concerning restoration at Chota. However I do. not recall any 
specific ,approval of the "'l'l!1S presented by TVA and that any encouragement 
showed f r the reconstruction was only as a last resort with no other alternatives 
but flo~...o ing the valley proposed by TVA. Futher despondent sayeth not. 
I a cldre under penalty 
~. :1. h ' . • <t=~ ~r·i----
of perjury that the foregoing ., s true and 
correct. This the :JS Jt) day of October, 1979 
(SEAL~~,_ ..t....L/~_...J-.7_5~<> .-
.., 
t 
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DULLUULt:.H~ AN[) ARCHEOLOGY 
CAN THEY BE COMPATIBLE'" 
The Tellico Dam 
Where Both i\rcheologists and a Government Agency Are Being Tested 
lloiJmg Iii~ hauJ a good two kct 
above his desktop, Beverly Burbage, 
veteran Tennessee Va!iey Authority 
lawyer, emphasized the sprawling gov-
ernment agcm:y's record in arche-
ological investigation: 
"If you stacked all the reports from 
the salvage archeology TVA funded. 
during the early reservoir projects, 
they'd come way up to here," he said. 
"We Wl'ren't ulllkr thc same restric-
tions as other Federal agcncics - we 
could fund archeological activity 
directly - and from. the very outset 
when TVA was created and through-
out the 1930's, its management rec-
ognized that archeological resources 
were important." 
Ironically, that sense of regard for 
archeological remains, which has con-
tinued into the I ')60's and I 970's, is 
today a major factor in a controversy 
in which the TVA is being criticized for 
mismanaging a mother lode of know-
ledge about this country's heritage. 
Involved in that criticism is a single 
project, the Tellico dam and reservoir, 
the same project already well-fixed in 
the nation's consciousness for having 
been stopped since 1977 under the En-
dangered Species Act by a tiny fish 
called the snail darter. By the TVA'~ 
accounting, more than $4 million has 
been spent since 1967 on preservation 
restoration, protection, and arche·· 
ological investigation in connectior. 
Summer 1 Y7Y 
By John 8. Carlson 
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The American people, through their 
elected representatives in Congress, have 
mandated the protection of the country's 
non-renewable archeological resources on 
projects involving FederalfundinR. One of 
the obligations assigned by Congre.\:Y is il-
lustrated here by the TVA sign warning of 
the penalties for vandalism. It's literally a 
sign of growing power - but managing 
that power properly is the problem/aced by 
government agencies and archeologists 
alike. 
with the 'ldlico projecl. 
Yet the TVA's critics- among them 
archeologists Jefferson Chapman and 
Gerald Schroedl of the University of 
Tennessee - contend that the TVA's 
handling of archeological resources at 
Tellico has ignored some of the agen-
cy's major responsibilities. Sixteen-
thousand acres of the Little Tennessee 
River valley would be flooded if the 
Tellico dam gates were dosed. Chap-
man and Schroedl have submitted tes-
timony to Congressional sub-com-
mittees arguing Chat - despite the ex-
penditure of millions of doliars -
such flooding would effectively des-
troy a "unique and significant" .record 
of more than 10,000 years of prehis-
toric, historic American Indian and 
Anglo-American occupation, a record 
that has not been adequately in-
vestigated and/or preserved. 
"No one knew, when Tellico started 
in 1967, that it wouldn't be completed 
according to the original timetable 
three years later," says Burbage, "and 
now that the project has become a 
marathon, all this hindsight criticism 
leaves me cold." 
That criticism, however, appears to 
be supported by a maze of new Fed-
eral laws and guidelines that came into 
effect as the project has proceeded. 
The "salvage" mentality that ruled the 
actions of both TVA officiais and ar-
cheologists even before Tellico began 
3 
f 
•• 
is being replaced by a "conservation" 
ethic, which calls less for intensive ex-
cavation than for locating and preserv-
ing threatened archeological remains 
in the most prudent manner. 
A shift in national values that places 
increasing importance on potentials 
for human benefit in the environment 
that arc not as tangible as highways 
and dams, and the evolution of ar-
cheology toward a higher level of per-
formance, have been powerful forces 
in shaping this new approach. And the 
controversy has essentially grown out 
of the development of these new ways 
4 
for handling archeological resources. 
In 1933, when TVA was created by 
Congress as a government corporation 
with the "flexibility and initiative of a 
private enterprise," the nation was in 
the midst of the Great Depression. In 
addition to Tennessee, portions of six 
other states felt the agency·~ inllucncc 
as it exercised its developing expertise 
in re-generating the land. The Tellico 
project was put on the drawing board 
as early as 1936. 
Burbage recalls the engineering con-
cepts that went into the project. The 
water the dam impounded would be 
diverted to surplus generator capacity 
already built into nearby Fort Lou-
doun dam, creating enough additional 
energy "from a clean, renewable re-
source" to heat some 20,000 homes. 
The 30-mile-long reservoir behind the 
dam would bring badly-needed dollars 
to the three neighboring impoverished 
counties from the influx of industry, 
navigation, and recreation. The dam's 
flood control features "would have 
taken two feet of water off Chat-
tanooga if we'd had it in place in the 
big 1973 flood." 
Delayed by material shortages and 
Early Man 
more immediate power construct•~··' priorities during World War II, the Tellico project was not reactivated un-
til the late I 960's. Tho-hundred years 
earlier, Henry Timberlake, a British 
colonial officer, had mapped the prin-
cipal Overbill Cherokee towns that 
then existed in the Little Tennessee 
valley. Burbage pointed out that the 
TVA's mapping service had been sell-ing copies of that map some 20 years 
before Tellico began. 
"We knew the Little T valley would 
require extensive archeological in-
vestigation," says Burbage, "and we 
advised the National Park Service of 
that fact before construction got under 
way." 
The Historic Sites Act of 1935 had 
transferred responsibility from the 
Smithsonian Institution to the Na-
tional Park Service for carrying out "a 
national policy to preserve for public 
use historic sites, buildings, and ob-jects of national signficance for the in-
spiration and benefit of the people" -
including surveys to determine which historic and archeological sites,. buildings, and objects have excep-
tional value. 
As far as everyone involved was 
concerned, the Timberlake map 
eliminated the need for any exhaustive 
surveys in the valley tQ identify impor-
tant sites; and the TVA, park service, 
and archeologists fell into a routine 
. that had been established over the 
years. 
Basically, that routine - condition-
ed by such laws as the Antiquities Act 
of 1906 and the Reservoir Salvage Act 
of 1960 - called for salvaging as 
much information as possible in the 18 
months or so available before the 
scheduled impoundment. University 
crews were brought from other arche-
ological .. projects to concentrate on 
those of Tellico. 
As the funding agency, the National 
Park Service agreed that this was the 
procedure to follow. Since all of the 
known Overbill Cherokee village sites 
in the reservoir area could not be ex-
cavated in the time allotted - and 
since some were on land that the TVA had not yet acquired from landowners 
who refused access for digging - the 
archeologists and the park service 
Summer 1979 
worked out strategy to recover what 
they felt was the most significant data 
and material. 
"We had to determine priorities on 
the assumption that the original time-
table for closing the gates on TeHico 
would be met," says Burbage; TVA 
then had no archeologists on its staff. 
"We look~d to the university and the 
Park Service people for technical ex-
pertise and professional guidance," he 
says, adding: "Any criticism of what 
was done ignored the tremendous han-dicaps everyone was under.'' 
One of these handicaps was Park Service funds for archeological work 
-then totalling about $1.5 million for 
the entire country. These were notal-
located on the basis of how important 
a project might be, but on a regional 
basis throughout the United States. 
Each regional archeologist was a lob-byist for the projects in his area, Bur-bage recalls, and the archeologist in 
charge of the southeast area then had 
the job of spreading it around a 
number of states. 
Furthermore, commitments could be made only year-by-year, and Bur-
bage adds: "The park service couldn't 
give Ted· Gulhe (pronounced Guda) 
the commitment he needed to be able 
to hire top-flight people from other parts of the country ori something like 
a three or four-year contract." 
Now an anthropology professor at 
the University of Tennessee, Alfred 
"Ted" Guthe was then head of the an-
thropology department and director of 
the university's McClung Museum. As 
such, he became the ''principal inves-
tigator" for the project and directed 
planning and fieldwork from its incep-
tion until late 1976. 
"The nine Overbill Cherokee vil-lages in the valley were among the few 
remaining anywhere that had not been 
seriously vandalized," says Guthe, 
"and since such sites had never been 
systematically investigated, no one 
questioned going to work on them." 
At the time Europeans first en-
countered the Cherokee, their villages 
covered the Southern Appalachians, 
and their hunting grounds extended 
across Tennessee, Kentucky, Ala-bama, and Georgia. All of the Chero-kee considered themselves part of a 
unified Nation, however, each town 
tracing its descent from the Little Ten-
nessee valley, where for most of the 
1700's, Chota was the nation's 
"peacetown." At one and the same 
time, Chota was the Cherokee "Mec-
ca" and "Washington, D.C." 
Another Cherokee town in the val-
ley - Tuskegee - was the birthplace 
of Sequoyah, one of the· Cherokee's 
most revered individuals. He was the 
"genius" inventor of a syllabary that 
converted the Cherokee language into 
written form and is still used today in 
the Cherokee enclaves of Oklahoma 
and North Carolina. 
Furthermore, historical records in-dicate that the Overbill Cherokee 
significantly affected America's de-
velopment as a result of their alliance 
with the British when England and 
France were contending for domina-
tion of the continent. 
As early as 1968, the TVA began funding the excavations, matching 
amounts allocated by the park service. Since then, of the more than $4 million 
expen{led on historic preservation and 
archeology at Tellico, TVA estimates 
that it has contributed 75 per ~.:cnt of 
that amount. However, not all of 
those funds went into actual digging. 
In the early stages, it was recognized 
that Fort Loudoun - the first British 
outpost west of the Allegheny Moun-
tains, built in 1756-57 and captured 
and burned by tlie Cherokee in 1760 
- would need to be preserved. Owned by the state, the fort had been partially 
reconstructed over a period of 40 
years. If a protective dike were built 
around the site, the fort could remain 
where it was and be protected from the 
reservoir water surrounding it. 
However, it soon was learned that the fort sat "on a piece of Swiss cheese" 
- limestone bedrock full of holes -
and pumps probably could never keep 
water out of the protected area. 
The decision was therefore made to 
raise the site with 17 feet of fill and to 
reconstruct the fort above future pool 
level. Before that was done, the entire 
area covered by the fort's palisaded 
walls was excavated under TVA con-
tract by archeologists from the state's Department of Conservation. 
Directly across the river from Fort 
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Loudoun was the Tellico Bloc;....',ouse 
- an American military outpost from 
1794 to I ~07. It al.so was ahno!.l I 00 
per cent excavated. After stabilizing 
the foundation of the Blockhouse, an 
interpretive exhibit will be installed at 
the site. 
· 
Additionally, a half-mile causeway 
was built, for access by the public, to 
the area of Chota where the 1750-1780 
Cherokee capital's council house was 
located. This area, after complete ex-
cavation, also was raised above pool 
level. "The TVA has committed itself 
to the Cherokee - both the Eastern band and the Cherokee Nation in Ok-
lahoma - to reconstruct the council 
house and hearth directly over their ori~inal local ion," says Burbage. 
"Identifiable Cherokee buri<.~ls will be 
re-interred, with appropriate markers, 
and a memorial monument and park-
ing area built." 
According to the TVA, more than $1.75 million has gone into protection, 
preservation, and restoration activities 
such as this. 
And beginning in the early 1970's, 
several archeological consultants par-
ticipated in the decisions. "We 
recognized that we didn •t haw techni-
cal expertise," says Burbage, "and 
because we were spending a substan-
tial amount of money, we wanted a 
professional overview." The TVA ap-
pointed an advisory panel consisting 
of the late Dr. John Corbett, who had 
retired as chief archeologist for the 
National Park Service; Dr. Robert Ste-
phenson, who had conducted river 
basin surveys for the Smithsonian 
when it had responsibility for salvage; 
and Dr. John 0. Brew, director of the 
Peabody Museum at Harvard for 
some 20 years and chairman of the 
Committee for the Recovery of Ar-
cheological Remains in the National 
Park Service. 
"We thought we got three of the top 
archeologists in the country," says 
Burbage, "and we also asked people 
like Stan South and Dr. John Cotter 
- whom I regard as two of the leading 
historical archeologists - to look at 
what we were doing at Fort Loudoun 
and the Blockhouse." 
Today, however, Chapman at;td 
Schroedl question the decisions that 
6 
were made. "In terms of the valley's 
archeological potential, is the expen-
diture of $1.75 million for the protec-
tion and restoration activities of only 
three sites warranted?" Schroedl asks. 
He goes on to point out that in more 
than a decade less than 5 per cent of 
most of the sites excavated has been 
exposed. Chota is estimated to cover 
up to 60 acres. No one is certain how 
large the village was because surveys 
have not been undertaken to establish 
its extent. But according to Schroedl, 
less than 9 per cent of its area has been 
investigated. 
"Chota - and many other sites in 
the valley- are too important to per-
mit their destruction by flooding with-
out at least determining how IIHH:h 
more can be lcam.:d from them," he 
says. 
A summary of the valley's known 
archeological significance includes not 
only the Cherokee villages, but also re-
mains from earlier pe;:iods going back 
at least 9,500 years. Archeologists 
have found human burials there that 
are among the earliest in North Amer-
ica, the earliest evidence of basketry in 
the eastern United States, and docu-
mentation for some of the earliest use 
of domestic squash and gourds. 
Woodland remains link the valley with 
one of the peaks of prehistoric cultural 
development in eastern North America 
called Hopeweil, and the valley con-
tains one of the few remaining Middle 
Mississippian ceremonial centers 
known in the southeast. 
However, though some archeolo-
gists believe that the record of 
prehistory within the 30-mile-long pro-ject area cannot be matched anywhere 
in the country in a similar-sized area, 
only a relatively small portion of the 
16,000 acres that would be flooded by 
the Tellico reservoir has been in-
vestigated for archeological sites. And 
even where surface surveys have been 
made, the evidence of many prehistor-ic occupations may have been missed 
because they lie buried. 
In 1976, Chapman received a grant 
from the National Geographic Society 
to dig deep testing trenches on terraces 
close to the river. He discovered a 
number of sites buried up to 15 feet deep that dated betw.een 7,000 and 
9,500 years ago. "Although a few Ear-
ly Archak sites of this type exist else-
where in the eastern U.S.," says Chap-
man, "nowhere have so many been 
identified in a single valley, providing 
an unprecedented opportunity io re-
construct early settlement systems." 
Another example of a buried occu-
pation comes from the Cherokee 
viilage of Citico, where in 1978, a level 
dating to between 5,800 and 6,000 
B.C. was discovered accidentally while 
archeologists excavated large storage 
pits. 
Considering the length of time the 
Tellico project has been under way, 
while the snail darter and other legal 
actions have delayed it, is it fair and 
reasonable to confront !he TVA wi1h 
new discoveries, ideas and regulations 
as to what should be done arche-
ologically in the valley? 
Burbage obviously does not think 
so. "Archeologists have had more op-
portunity and a longer period of time 
to work on Tellico," he says, "than 
any river basin project in the coun-
try." He adds: "More money has been 
spent on archeology at Tellico than 
any other public project anywhere in 
the U.S." 
The Moss-Bennett law of 1974 au-
thorized Federal agenc'~s to spend up 
to I per cent of the total cost of a pro-ject on cultural resource preservation. 
The total cost for Tellico thus far is 
somewhere between $113 million and $120 million, and Burbage contends: 
"The money that TVA put directly in-
to archeological recovery at Tellico 
more than doubles the limitation of 1 
.per cent. A tremendous amount of 
knowledge and information was ob-
tained that will occupy analysts, 
students, and scholars for years to 
come.'' 
Tom Waller, a civil engineer who 
was appointed by the TVA to manage 
archeology contracts because he had 
experience in contract administration, 
considers one of the problems to be 
"ail of the specializations that have 
come into archeology in recent years.'' 
Says Waller: "The archeologists keep 
coming back and re-defining their re-
search goals. We've got to be account..: 
able to the taxpayer, and archeologists 
have not done mm:h to interpret the 
Early Man 
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Although only limited archeological surveys have 
been made In the valley ol the Little Tennassea River 
encompased by the Tellico project, archeologists 
have identified 285 sites within the 16,000 acres of 
the proposed reservoir (shown hare in darker color). 
Most of these sites have not bo=en investigated and 
evaluated. Named places on the map include 
historic Cherokee, Anglo-American and pn:histodc 
sites where preservation, restoration and/or ar· 
cheological investigation have been carried out . 
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(Cherokee Village) 
value of some of the things th:: .'.arc 
doing to us or to the public." ·. · 
Another TVA administrator, civil 
engineer Maurice Msarsa, compares 
the archeologists' demands to those of 
an architect, who, after contracting to 
build a house, returns to insist: "You 
arc not doing your family justice -
you must add .1 W<l rooms." Msarsa 
until recently was the person immedi-
ately responsible for archeological ac-
tivity at Tellico in its later stages. He 
goes on with the analogy: "After tell-
ing the family it needs another bath-
room to go with the additional rooms, 
the architect finally says, 'You haven't 
covered all the land with your house.' 
The archeologists are doing the same 
thing as this hypothetical architect." 
However, archeologists contend 
that if the TVA had carrieu out its 
responsibilities long ago, as the 
various archeological conservation 
laws and guidelines took effect, the ar-
cheological work called for would 
have been more economical. Basically, 
this work consists of: (1) identifying as 
many of the total archeological re-
'; 
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sources in the Tellico Projc~.:t area .>. ·.·. 
modern scientific field methods will 
allow, (2) assessing the importance of 
the various ancient sites, and (3) devis-
ing an intelligent pian to protect the 
most important of these, or recover in-
formation from them by excavation, 
before they are damaged by flooding 
or conslrl!l:lion activities. 
Instead, the archeologists say that 
the TVA has held to a poiicy whereby 
"their only obligation is to fund big 
salvage operations." In Schroedl's 
words: "It would be a physical im-
possibility to save every archeological 
site in the country, and the laws don't 
say anything about that. In fact, in 
20th century America some resources 
are going to be destroyed. But when a 
bulldozer runs through a burial 
mound, that's not the time to think 
about how great the Joss was. 
"When a project is on the drawing 
table, that's when you go out and 
study the soils, the geology, the cul-
tural resources. Suppose you want to 
build a highway, and you discover a 
burial mound in the right-of-way. 
How much does it cost for the drafts-
man to take his pencil and re-route 
that highway? Once you've got the 
highway under way, and then find a 
mound in its path, it will cost you hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars to exca-
vate. You have also eliminated a non-
renewable resourc~ -- forever. 
"Excavation should be the last· re-
source - it's the most expensive op-
tion - and the whole process of ar-
cheological preservation begins with 
locating and assessing the resources." 
Up to the present time, a total of 
285 sites have been identified in the 30 
miles of the Little Tennessee valley en-
compassed by the Tellico project. 
Almost 200 of these were located as 
recently as 1976 and 1977, when a 
limited survey was carried out. And 
stili, the entire area of the valley that 
would be flooded has not been 
systematically surveyed. 
"How can you assess the impact of 
the dam on archeological resources," 
asks Schroedl, "when you don't know 
what the resources are?" 
Chapman and Schroedl both came 
Pholo. Oep<u lme111 ol Anlhropology, Umversrly ol lellllessee 
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into the pil.:ture in the early 1970's. 
Brought in by Guthe as a field super-
visor in 1973, Chapman now is a re-
search assistant professor and princi-
pal investigator on the Tellico project. 
Schroedl ~tartc<.l as a riel<.! supervisor 
in 1972 and is an assistant professor 
specializing in cultural resource 
management. 
Their arrival coincided with the 
signing of Executive Order 11593 
(1971) and the enactment of the Moss-
Bennett Act (1974), two of the laws 
that have had a major effect on the 
handling of archeological resources. 
In 1974, a detailed set of procedures 
Wll:-. outliunl hy lht· Advisnry ( 'mllll'il 
011 lli~turil: Preservation lo coordinate 
the implementation of all the laws, in-
cluding the 1966 National Historic 
Preservation Act. 
The archeoiogists cite Section 106 of 
that Act as a key one in their dif-
ferences with the TVA. It reads: 
'The head of any Federal Agency 
having direct or indirect jurisdiction 
over a proposed Federal or Federally 
assisted undertaking in any State and 
PtiOtO Departmenl of Anthropology, Umverstly ol Tennessee 
the head of any Federal department or 
independent agency having authority 
to license any undertaking sha/1 prior 
to the approval of the expenditure of 
any Federal funds on the undertaking 
or prior to the issuance of any license, 
as the case may be, take infO account 
the effect of the undertaking on any 
district, site, building structure, or ob-
ject that is included in the National 
Register. The head of any such Federal 
agency shall afford the Advisory 
Council Oll Historic Preservation es-
tablished under title II of 1his Act a 
reasonable opportunity to comment 
with regard to such undertakinr:." 
Suh~cqm·nt ly, Sec I io11 1()(, wa~ 
amended to cover not only sites al-
ready listed in the National Register, 
but any determined to be eligible, so 
that a Federal agency could not merely 
consult the Register in the fulfiHment 
of its obligations. 
Under the Advisory Council's pro-
cedures, a Federal agency is required 
to reach a Memorandum of Agree-
ment - a mutual understanding -
. with the State Historic Preservation 
Officer and the Advisory Council 
stipulating how sites included in or 
eligible for the National Register of 
Historic Places will be "preserved." 
Preservation means either professional 
excavation to extract adequate infor-
mation from a site before its destruc-
tion (or inundation), or the taking of 
whatever steps are necessary to avoid 
destroying it. 
After almost five years, Schroedl 
points out, the TVA does not have a 
Memorandum of Agreement covering 
all the archeological resources in the 
valley. But, he adds, "the laws are 
something like the 55-mile-per-hour 
spec<.! limit. If everyone drives over 
that speed without being curbed, it's 
as if you haven't got a speed law at 
all." 
About a year ago, Chapman and 
Schroedl decided to force the issue, 
and nominated the entire 38,000 acres 
of the Little Tennessee valley and 
neighboring bluffs in the Tellico pro-
ject area to the National Register as an 
archeological district. Subsequently, 
the TV.<\ submitted its own revised ver-
Photo Department of Anthropology, UnJversJtY of Tennessee 
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sion of the nomination, limited to 
16,000 acres that actually would t> 
flooded. 
"Nominating only the pool area 
misses the whole point," says Chap-
man. "All of the prehistoric sites 
within the pool area and above it were 
formerly part of a human living 
system. If archeologists are going to 
understand this system, then sites 
representative of every human activity 
within it must be preserved, or, failing 
that, must be excavated to recover im-
portant information. Therefore, any 
archeological conservation program at 
Tellico must consider not only the sites 
that will be flooded but also those that 
lie nearby. These are essential for 
understanding past human behavior, 
and are also subject to destruction 
from the well-known . 'secondary-
impact' expected from construction 
activities that will take place around 
!he reservoir shoreline once the water 
impoundment is complete." 
The TVA, on the other hand, in-
dicated that it nominated only that 
area of the project that warranted 
nomination on the basis of sufficient 
information to assess signficance. 
"TVA recognizes that a survey of 
above-pool lands is required," says 
Burbage, "and it will be made as time 
and funds permit." 
At any rate, last Jmmary the Keeper 
of the National Register in Washing-
ton made a determination of eligibility 
of the valley. And as Schroedl sums it 
up: "That put the TVA, in 1979, 
where it should have been long ago -
working out with the State Historic 
Preservation Officer and the Advisory 
Council how the archeological re-
sources in the valley arc best 
handled." 
Since then, the TVA commissioned 
the Interagency Archeological Services 
of the Department of Interior's Her-
itage Conscervation and Recreation 
Service, Atlanta office, to prepare a 
case report documenting the arche-
ological work that has been done thus 
far and making recommendations for 
additional work that might be needed. 
The case report takes into account 
two alternatives for the Tellico project: 
(I) The lifting of legal restraints (i. e. 
the snail darter injunction) and th~ 
10 
closing of the dam's gates, permitting 
the Little Tennessee valley to be flood-
ed, and (2) The adoption of a 
"riverine" plan first suggested by the 
TVA last December to develop the 
valley for such uses as agriculture, 
recreation, environmental-cultural in-
terpretation, and limited industry, in 
which case the gates would not be clos-
ed, the dam would be dismantled, and 
the archeological shes would not be 
flooded and thereby destroyed.· 
Burbage says, ''As a part of the on-
going process of TVA compliance with 
related Federal laws and regulations, 
the draft case report is presently under 
review. This review will include con-
sideration of recommendations from 
TVA's board of archeological con-
sultants. No decisions will be made hy 
TVA, however, until these various 
recommendations can be studied in 
detail." 
No field work is being canit:d out in 
the valley this swnmer, except for 
surveys at Morganton, an early 19th 
century town that was instrumental in 
river traffic and was noted for its craft 
specialties. Laboratory analysis and 
report writing to complete previous in-
vestigatiqns is continuing, however, 
and archeologists will be working in 
that phase of the project another year-
and-a-half to two years. 
In the meantime, the Tellico project 
obviously does not exemplify cultural 
resource management at its best. And 
the flow of events outlined here pro-
vokes a number of questions. 
Is the Tellico experience as much 
one of controversy as one of a struggle 
by both a government agency and the 
archeological community to function 
effectively when new dcmallds arc 
placed upon them? Docs part of the 
problem lie in the re-defining of goals, 
.both those mandated by laws to 
Federal agencies such as the TVA and 
those imposed on archeologists by the 
new laws as well as an evolving science 
with its new and more productive ways 
of studying prehistoric remains? Is 
Tellico an example of a situation that 
illustrates the appearance of new 
responsibilities for government agen-
cies and the archeological profession 
alike, responsibilities that require both 
to consider a substantially new ap-
proach to the archeological resources? 
For more than 40 years the TVA has 
been engaged in activities relating 
primarily to the natural resources of 
the southeast, defining its functions in 
terms of dams, flood control, power 
production, recreational lakes, fer-
tilizer production, reforestation, 
reclamation of worn-out land - all 
so-called bread-and-butter goals to 
serve the public. Most of its ac-
cumulated experience lies in dealing 
with soils, landforms, and water. 
When new kinds of demands came 
along - less immediate and less tangi-
ble demands, such as those involved in 
protecting an endangered species -
TVA found itself in an unfamiliar 
area. In the matter of handling re-
mains of human history in new ways 
which evolved as the Teilico ·project 
proceeded, !he TVA also found ilsclf 
without expertise and without a wcll-
tlcfinctl sense of its new legal respon-
sibilities. 
But more than that, it had not yet 
developed a program to conserve and 
interpret for the people the eJ<tensive 
evidence of early man located within 
its southeastern domain. It had not 
learned how to extend to archeological 
sites the creative mandate under which 
TVA was founded in the early 1930's 
and in whose fulfillment it has achiev-
ed notable success in the many areas of 
human physical need. 
As the archeological goals grew 
larger,· the agency said in effect: 
"We've been doing what you said we 
had to do." Millions of dollars ex-
pended on archeological activities 
testify to at least a conscientious effort 
in ihe right direction. TVA now has 
two profe.';>sional archeologists on its 
staff. It deals more closely with a 
board of archeological consultants it 
retains as advisers. And it appears to 
be moving toward compliance with 
, cultural resource laws. 
Meanwhile, the new laws put arche-
ology in an unfamiliar role, as well. It 
took a number of years for the Interior 
Department's Interagency Arche-
ological Services to provide leadl!r-
ship. getting its aid to Federal agencies 
in cultural resource management off 
the ground. Until recently, those agen-
cies received little direction and had 
Early Man 
.....,;....,cu_•n""'W1'1'110""'FI ..... _"":"!_I!Il\lii ___ "!""' __ ,,._~--SZI-4Ifi!PiifiiiiU.-~-JIU!.!II!i&llf,llil£!l!!l!llii~~'UitQQ~~~~fdl ~ ~ 
. ·~ ... ' . ' . . :. "'';,.'.' '~ . ... ·. , ... , . 
. .... 
